Bernardez v. City Government of Baguio
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The City Government of Baguio enacted Ordinance No. 01, series of 2004, appropriating funds for the reorganization of its local departments. Subsequently, the City Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 171, series of 2004, designating Engineer Oscar V. Flores as Acting Building Official pending the appointment of a permanent head for the newly created Building and Architecture Office. The petitioner, Leo Bernardez, Jr., who was the City Engineer at the time, filed a complaint assailing the validity of Administrative Order No. 171, arguing that it usurped his functions as City Engineer and violated provisions of the Local Government Code and the National Building Code. He contended that the City Engineer should also act as the local building official and that the ordinance basis for the administrative order was improper. 2. Procedural History: The petitioner filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of Administrative Order No. 171 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The RTC initially granted a temporary restraining order but later lifted it and denied the application for a preliminary injunction. After trial, the RTC dismissed the petitioner's complaint, holding that the validity of Ordinance No. 01 could not be collaterally attacked and that Administrative Order No. 171 was therefore valid. The RTC also found that the issue was rendered moot by the subsequent appointment of Flores as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, and that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the administrative order and had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, agreeing with its findings and reasoning. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. 3. The Petition: This case is before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks to reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals, raising several issues. Primarily, he argues that Administrative Order No. 171 is invalid because it allegedly violates Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code, which he interprets as mandating the City Engineer to also serve as the local building official. He also questions the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to appoint a separate Building Official and argues that the creation of a separate Building Official position usurped his functions. Furthermore, he contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he was estopped and had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The petitioner asserts that Administrative Order No. 171 should be nullified for being contrary to law.
Issue(s)
Whether Administrative Order No. 171, Series of 2004 (AO 171), designating Engineer Oscar Flores as Acting Building Official, should be nullified for being contrary to law, and the validity of Ordinance No. 01 and the creation of the CBAO. Whether Section 477, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code (LGC), mandating the City and Municipal Engineer to also act as the local building official, prohibits the appointment of a separate local building official. Whether the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) has the authority to appoint a local building official under Rule II, Section 203 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the National Building Code (NBC). Whether the petitioner is in estoppel and failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint is affirmed. The Supreme Court ruled that the issue of the validity of AO 171 is moot and academic due to supervening events, specifically the subsequent appointment of Engineer Oscar Flores as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office (CBAO). The Court also held that the creation of a separate office for a Building Official, distinct from the City Engineer, is permissible under the LGC and the NBC, and that the DPWH Secretary has the authority to appoint Building Officials.
Ratio Decidendi
On the mootness of AO 171 and the validity of Ordinance No. 01: The Court held that the issue of the validity of AO 171, which designated Engineer Oscar Flores as Acting Building Official, had become moot and academic due to Flores' subsequent appointment as Department Head of the CBAO. The Court reiterated that courts will not pass upon questions where no actual interests are involved, and that a case becomes moot when there is no longer an actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Since AO 171 was no longer operative, it would be futile for the Court to declare it valid or invalid. The Court affirmed the RTC's ruling that the validity of Ordinance No. 01 could not be subjected to a collateral attack. It is a well-entrenched rule that the validity of a local ordinance must be assailed in a direct proceeding. Since Ordinance No. 01 was presumed valid and was not directly challenged, its implementing order, AO 171, was also maintained. The Court emphasized that laws and administrative orders are presumed valid and cannot be attacked collaterally. On the appointment of a separate Building Official: The Court disagreed with the petitioner's contention that Section 477(a) of the LGC, which states that the City and Municipal Engineer shall also act as the local building official, prohibits the appointment of a separate Building Official. The Court clarified that while this provision exists, the LGC, particularly Sections 18 and 76, empowers local government units to design their organizational structure and staffing patterns, and Section 454(c) allows the Sangguniang Panlungsod to create other offices as necessary. Furthermore, Rule II, Section 203 of the IRR of the NBC explicitly allows for the appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City/Municipal Engineer. The Court noted that many highly urbanized cities have already established separate offices for Building Officials due to operational demands. On the authority of the DPWH Secretary to appoint Building Officials: The Court reiterated its ruling in Tapay v. Cruz, which recognized the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to appoint Building Officials. Building Officials are considered deputies of the Secretary in enforcing the National Building Code and exercise a function of national concern, making them national officials. Therefore, their appointment is the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways. The Court emphasized that the administration and enforcement of the NBC is a primary concern of the national government. On estoppel and failure to exhaust administrative remedies: The Court agreed with the lower courts that the petitioner was estopped from questioning AO 171, partly because he had voluntarily turned over his functions and desisted from exercising them. Moreover, the Court found that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, specifically by not raising the issues to the Oversight Committee as mandated by the LGC. The Court reiterated that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal, unless the issues are purely legal, which was not the case here as the petitioner's arguments broadened to include the validity of reorganization and creation of offices.
Main Doctrine
The designation of an Acting Building Official through an Administrative Order becomes moot and academic upon the subsequent appointment of an official to a new, permanent position, rendering the challenge to the validity of the Administrative Order moot. Furthermore, the creation of a separate office for a Building Official, distinct from the City Engineer, is permissible under the Local Government Code and the National Building Code, provided it is done through appropriate ordinances and in the interest of efficient public service.