District of Benguet v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company

G.R. No. 244063, G.R. No. 244216 · 2022-06-21 · J. INTING, J.: · Primary: Political Law; Secondary: Remedial Law, Civil Law
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: In 1990, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), entered into Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. 001-90 with respondents Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and Far Southeast Gold Resources, Inc. The MPSA authorized mining operations in Mankayan, Benguet, an area covering ancestral domains of the Mankayan Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs). The agreement had a 25-year term, renewable for another 25 years "upon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties or as may be provided by law." Subsequently, Congress enacted the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942) and the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA, RA 8371). Section 59 of the IPRA requires a "Free and Prior Informed and Written Consent" (FPIC) from affected ICCs/IPs and a certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as a precondition for the renewal of any production-sharing agreement. Procedural History: As the MPSA's expiration neared in 2015, respondents applied for renewal. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) informed them that their application would be endorsed to the NCIP for compliance with the FPIC requirement. Respondents objected, claiming a vested right to renewal under the MPSA's original terms and arguing that the IPRA requirement impaired their contract. They initiated arbitration proceedings. The Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favor of respondents, holding that the FPIC requirement was an "unfavorable future legislation" that could not be validly imposed. The Republic filed a Petition to Vacate the Arbitral Award with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 141. The RTC vacated the award, finding that the tribunal exceeded its authority and the award violated the public policy embodied in the IPRA. Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Petition: The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the arbitral award, ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by reviewing the merits of the award. The Republic (in G.R. No. 244216) and the Lone Congressional District of Benguet (in G.R. No. 244063) filed separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Republic argued that the CA erred in setting aside the RTC's decision, as the arbitral award was void for violating public policy and for being rendered in excess of the tribunal's authority. The District of Benguet assailed the CA's denial of its motion to intervene.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion for leave to intervene of the District of Benguet. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the Arbitral Award, which exempted the renewal of MPSA No. 001-90 from the FPIC and NCIP Certification Precondition under the IPRA.

Ruling

The petition in G.R. No. 244216 is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 30, 2018 and the Resolution dated January 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146806 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Final Award dated November 27, 2015 issued by the Arbitral Tribunal is VACATED without prejudice to respondents' full compliance with the requirement of the "Free and Prior Informed and Written Consent" of the Mankayan ICCs/IPs as a condition for the renewal of MPSA No. 001-90. The petition in G.R. No. 244063 is DENIED.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1 (Intervention): The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the District of Benguet's motion to intervene. The remedy of intervention under the Rules of Court does not extend to arbitration cases, which are governed by the Special ADR Rules and the principle of party autonomy. The Special ADR Rules do not provide for intervention, and Rule 22.1 thereof states that applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are already incorporated or specifically referred to. Even if applicable, the motion was filed belatedly at the appellate stage, contrary to Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which requires intervention to be filed before the trial court renders judgment. The Court also noted that the State, through the MGB-DENR, already represents the interests of the ICCs/IPs. On Issue 2 (Validity of Arbitral Award): The Supreme Court ruled that the Arbitral Award must be vacated. While judicial review of arbitral awards is limited, an exception exists when an award violates public policy, a ground explicitly provided under Rule 19.10 of the Special ADR Rules. The protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands is a constitutionally declared state policy, which is clearly, categorically, and positively reflected in the IPRA's mandate for an FPIC. The Arbitral Tribunal's decision to excuse respondents from this requirement was not a mere error in law interpretation but a manifest disregard of a compelling public policy. This action also constitutes an act of exceeding its powers under Section 24 of the Arbitration Law, as the award prejudices the rights of the Mankayan ICCs/IPs, who were not parties to the arbitration, rendering the award incomplete and not final. The Court further held that respondents do not have a vested right to the MPSA's renewal, as it is a mere privilege subject to the State's police power. The MPSA's own renewal clause, which subjects it to conditions "as may be provided by law," encompasses the supervening requirements of the IPRA.

Main Doctrine

The renewal of a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) is not a vested right but a mere privilege granted by the State, which is subject to supervening laws enacted in the exercise of police power. The requirement of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) from Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) constitutes a strong and compelling public policy. An arbitral award that exempts a party from this mandatory legal requirement is void for being in manifest disregard of the law and contrary to public policy, providing a valid ground for its vacatur by the courts.

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