Republic v. Desierto
MODIFICATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns allegations of graft and corruption stemming from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on November 20, 1974, between the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), represented by Augusto Orosa, and Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII), owned by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The MOA was intended to finance a hybrid coconut seednut farm under Presidential Decree No. 582. Subsequently, the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), with Cojuangco, Jr. as its President, took over the administration of the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) and became a party to the MOA. The Republic alleges that the MOA and its subsequent amendments were grossly disadvantageous to the government, constituting a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The complaint further alleges conspiracy among Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara Lobregat, Rolando Dela Cuesta, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Danilo S. Ursua, Narciso M. Pineda, and Augusto Orosa. Procedural History: The complaint was initially filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on February 12, 1990, and subsequently referred to the Office of the Ombudsman. On August 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, through Graft Investigation Officer I Emora C. Pagunuran, recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription, which was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on August 14, 1998. The Republic's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 25, 1998, and approved by Ombudsman Desierto on October 9, 1998. The Republic then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court. Initially, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Ombudsman's dismissal and directing a preliminary investigation. However, in a subsequent resolution, the Court set aside its earlier decision, directed the Republic to serve copies of the petition to all respondents, and mooted a motion for reconsideration. The case has since seen further procedural developments, including the death of several respondents. The Petition: The Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Ombudsman's dismissal of its complaint on the ground of prescription. The Republic argues that the offense charged, being related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, is imprescriptible under the Constitution. Alternatively, it contends that even if subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the EDSA Revolution in February 1986, not from the execution of the MOA in 1974, due to the suppression of information and the legislative imprimatur given to the MOA. The Republic also challenges the Ombudsman's finding that the MOA was not disadvantageous to the government and criticizes the UCPB Board of Directors' failure to appeal the arbitral award. The petition raises issues of grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman in dismissing the case based on prescription and in failing to properly assess the merits of the complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the offense charged for violation of RA 3019 had already prescribed. Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that there is no basis to indict private respondents for violation of the Anti-Graft Law based on the contract in question. Whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.
Ruling
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. It reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's dismissal orders. The case was dismissed and terminated against respondents who died during the pendency of the petition. The Court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against the remaining respondents due to the violation of their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription of offense: The Court found that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of prescription. The Court reiterated that for offenses under RA 3019, the prescriptive period is generally 10 years, as provided at the time of the offense's commission. However, it clarified that the "discovery rule" under Act No. 3326 applies when the violation is not known at the time of commission. In this case, the MOA, despite being notarized, was executed pursuant to PD 582, which gave it "legislative imprimatur." This, along with subsequent confirmatory decrees (PD 961 and PD 1468), made it nearly impossible for the Republic to question the MOA's legality during the Marcos regime. Therefore, the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the discovery of the offense, which the Court linked to the promulgation of the 1986 Freedom Constitution, mandating the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and eradication of graft and corruption. The filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman in 1990 effectively tolled the prescriptive period, making the charge well within the 10-year limit from the discovery in 1986. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman should have proceeded with the preliminary investigation rather than dismissing the case on prescription. On the Ombudsman's discretion regarding indictment for violation of the Anti-Graft Law: While generally respecting the Ombudsman's discretion in determining probable cause, the Court held that this discretion was gravely abused when the dismissal was based on an erroneous application of the law on prescription and when the prolonged delay violated the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court emphasized that its intervention was warranted to correct these errors and ensure substantial justice. The Court also acknowledged that the death of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Maria Clara Lobregat, and Augusto Orosa during the pendency of the petition extinguished their criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. However, it clarified that any civil liability based on other sources of obligation (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, quasi-delicts) may still be pursued through a separate civil action against their respective estates. On the propriety of the petition and timeliness: The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the Ombudsman's dismissal of a complaint in a criminal case, not an appeal under Rule 45 or Section 27 of RA 6770, which applies only to administrative disciplinary cases. While the initial petition was filed slightly beyond the 60-day period under the old Rule 65, the Court applied the amended Rule 65 (promulgated as A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC) retroactively, which extended the period to 60 days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration. Under this amended rule, the petition was considered timely filed. The Court also relaxed the rules on service of the petition to respondents Concepcion and Lobregat, citing substantial justice and the absence of prejudice, as the initial failure was an honest mistake and the respondents were eventually served and allowed to comment. On the violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases: The Court found that the preliminary investigation, which commenced on February 12, 1990, and concluded with the Ombudsman's approval of the denial of the motion for reconsideration on October 9, 1998, spanned over eight years. This delay was deemed inordinate, especially since the Ombudsman's rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide much shorter periods for preliminary investigations. The Court noted that the Republic failed to provide sufficient justification for this extensive delay, and the respondents suffered prejudice due to the prolonged uncertainty and potential impairment of their defense. Consequently, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against the remaining respondents on this ground.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a complaint for violation of RA 3019 solely on the ground of prescription, when the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the discovery of the offense, especially in cases involving ill-gotten wealth and where legislative imprimatur obscured the illegality of the transaction. Furthermore, the inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violated the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.