Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Office of the Ombudsman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Roberto V. Ongpin, Jose D. Aspiras, Panfilo O. Domingo, Gerardo Agulto, Jr., Domingo G. Ingco, Bernardo M. Vergara, Federico Salcedo, and Merle Jean O. Deen for alleged violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The complaint stemmed from a US$20.0 Million loan granted by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to Marbella Club Incorporated (Marbella) in 1980, funded by a loan from the Central Bank (CB) to PNB. PCGG alleged that the loan was unwarranted, approved with manifest partiality, bad faith, or inexcusable negligence, and that PNB's waiver of its share in the sale proceeds of condominium units was grossly disadvantageous to the government. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause in its August 24, 2012 Resolution, finding that the prescriptive period had not yet set in but that the elements for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 were not sufficiently established. The Ombudsman noted that Marbella was a duly organized corporation with substantial capital, its project was evaluated, and the loan was guaranteed by the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) and secured by land. PCGG's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in its October 9, 2012 Order. The Petition: PCGG filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. PCGG contended that the loan approval was irregular, bore badges of former President Marcos' intervention, and that Marbella's loan was undercollateralized and lacking in sufficient equity, characterizing them as behest loans.
Issue(s)
Whether the Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Ombudsman's Resolution finding lack of probable cause. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Whether probable cause exists to indict the respondents for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is dismissed. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Propriety of the Remedy: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to assail a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative cases, and such petition should be filed directly with the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. This procedure is well-entrenched in jurisprudence, citing cases like Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and Estrada v. Desierto. On Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Ombudsman's resolution was based on facts and substantial evidence presented, leading to the conclusion that no probable cause existed to indict the respondents for violations of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman's findings were anchored on established facts, including Marbella's corporate status, the evaluation of its project, the PTA's guarantee, the land collateral, and the CB's approval after evaluating Marbella's profile and project feasibility. On Probable Cause for Violations of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court upheld the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause. For Sec. 3(e), there was no proof of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. For Sec. 3(g), the respondents did not enter into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the government. The Court noted that Marbella was not a fictional company, its project was evaluated, the loan was secured by PTA's guarantee and a mortgage on a 125-hectare property, and the CB approved the loan after due evaluation. The PCGG failed to prove that the loans were behest loans. The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause is an executive function, and the Court defers to its findings absent grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which requires a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause was based on substantial evidence, thus warranting adherence to the principle of non-interference.