De Vera v. People
REVERSALFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Allan de Vera y Ante was charged with violation of Section 5(6) of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610) for committing acts of lascivious conduct upon a 16-year-old minor, AAA, by allegedly fondling his penis and masturbating in her presence while she was taking a diagnostic exam. The Information was later considered as violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610 by the Court of Appeals (CA). Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to imprisonment and damages. The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty and damages, holding that masturbation in the presence of a minor constitutes child abuse under Section 10(a) of RA 7610. The Supreme Court, in a Decision dated January 20, 2021, affirmed the CA ruling. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing various points including inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, lack of proof of lewd design, and failure to prove psychological trauma. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended denial.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner committed the act of masturbation in the presence of the minor complainant. Whether the alleged psychological harm inflicted upon the minor complainant was severe or serious enough to constitute child abuse under RA 7610. Whether the prosecution sufficiently established the petitioner's specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the minor complainant. Whether the equipoise rule should apply, leading to the acquittal of the petitioner.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration, reversed its earlier Decision, and acquitted the petitioner. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner committed the alleged act of masturbation, that the psychological harm was severe or serious, and that the petitioner had the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the minor. The Court applied the equipoise rule, stating that when the evidence is consistent with innocence but also compatible with guilt, the evidence is at equipoise and does not fulfill the test of moral certainty for conviction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the prosecution sufficiently established the act of masturbation: The Court found material inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. Her judicial affidavit stated she saw the petitioner masturbating, but her sworn statement to the police omitted the masturbation, only mentioning seeing his penis. Her cross-examination testimony also indicated she deduced masturbation by correlating a sound with seeing the penis, rather than a direct observation of the act. Furthermore, her description of the sound varied from "kaluskos" (rustling) to "tapping" or "skin slapping against skin," which the Court found inconsistent. Her testimony regarding what the petitioner was holding in his hands also raised doubts about the clarity of her observation. These inconsistencies cast significant doubt on whether the act of masturbation actually occurred, rendering her lone testimony insufficient for conviction. On the issue of whether the psychological harm was severe or serious: The Court reconsidered its previous finding that the petitioner's conduct constituted psychological abuse. It emphasized that for psychological injury to qualify as child abuse under RA 7610, the harm must be severe or serious. The Court noted that foreign jurisprudence on indecent exposure suggests the harm done by such conduct is minimal. Moreover, the alleged exposure was for a fleeting moment, and the victim had prior awareness of masturbation through media and education. The Court also found the psychiatric assessment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) insufficient, as the psychiatrist did not adequately establish the cause of the disorder and admitted an omission regarding prior history of abuse. The Court highlighted that the victim's feeling of being demeaned was also attributed to her classmates laughing at her, not solely to the petitioner's alleged act. On the issue of whether the petitioner had the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean: The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove this specific intent. The Information alleged that the acts were done with the intent to prejudice the minor's development and to debase, degrade, or demean her dignity. However, the petitioner allegedly kept the door to the mini-library open, and other people were present in the reception area. This openness of the location, coupled with the inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, made it doubtful that the petitioner intended to debase or degrade the victim. His conduct did not involve touching or speaking to the victim, and she did not see him looking at her, suggesting a lack of direct intent to display the act to her. On the application of the equipoise rule: The Court applied the equipoise rule, stating that when the evidence is equally consistent with innocence and guilt, and the prosecution's evidence (the lone testimony of the victim) is met by credible defense evidence (corroborated by photographs and another witness), the presumption of innocence prevails. The inconsistencies in the victim's testimony and the corroboration of the defense's version led the Court to conclude that the evidence was in equipoise, necessitating acquittal.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner of violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, finding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner masturbated in the presence of the minor, that the alleged psychological harm was severe or serious, and that the petitioner had the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the minor's intrinsic worth and dignity. The Court applied the equipoise rule due to inconsistencies in the victim's testimony and the defense's corroborating evidence.