People v. Soria
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Marvin Soria y Sarmiento and Elmer Morauda III y Mirabuna were charged with violation of Section 77 of P.D. No. 705 for possessing and transporting 196 pieces of lumber without necessary DENR documents. The lumber was transported using a ten-wheeler Isuzu dump truck, purportedly owned by Eastern Island Shipping Lines Corporation (respondent) and leased by Elmer B. Belen. The lumber and the truck were confiscated. Procedural History: The accused pleaded guilty and were convicted by the RTC. The RTC ordered the confiscation of the lumber and the truck. Respondent Eastern Island Shipping Lines Corporation filed an Omnibus Motion asserting ownership of the truck and lack of knowledge or participation in the crime, praying for its release. The RTC denied the motion, citing Section 77 of P.D. No. 705 and stating that the special law prevails over the RPC. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC Order, nullifying it for grave abuse of discretion and ordering the release of the truck, holding that Article 45 of the RPC applies and respondent, as a third party, was denied due process. The Petition: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-PENRO) of Virac, Catanduanes, and the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing that confiscation of the vehicle is part of the penalty under P.D. No. 705 and that the special law prevails over the RPC.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Regional Trial Court's Order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the outright release of the truck. Whether the confiscation of the vehicle used in transporting timber and forest products is part of the imposable penalty under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and the application of Article 45 of the RPC and the due process rights of a third-party claimant. Whether P.D. No. 705, as amended, is a special law that prevails over a general statute such as the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' Decision with modification, remanding the confiscation aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings to allow the respondent to present evidence for its third-party claim.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Court of Appeals' finding of grave abuse of discretion and the procedural aspect of the petition, and on the Court of Appeals' outright order for the release of the truck: The Court noted respondent's failure to file a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari, but found exceptions applicable due to the claim of denial of due process. The Court reiterated that a motion for reconsideration is generally required, but exceptions exist, including when the order is a patent nullity, when there is an urgent necessity, or when the proceedings are a nullity for lack of due process. In this case, the claim of denial of due process regarding the confiscation of the truck justified the exception. While the CA correctly nullified the RTC Order for violating due process, it erred in ordering the outright release of the truck. The Court found that the ownership and non-participation of the respondent were factual matters that required proper presentation and examination of evidence. The CA's reliance on documents attached to the motion, which were not formally offered, was insufficient. Thus, the confiscation aspect must be remanded to the RTC for the proper presentation of evidence by the respondent and for the petitioners to have the opportunity to refute it. On whether the confiscation of the vehicle is part of the imposable penalty under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, and on the application of Article 45 of the RPC and the due process rights of a third-party claimant: The Court clarified that there are two kinds of confiscation under P.D. No. 705: administrative (Section 68-A) and judicial (Section 68). While Section 68-A explicitly includes "conveyances" in administrative confiscation, the amended Section 68, pertaining to judicial confiscation in criminal actions, only mentions "machinery, equipment, implements and tools" and does not explicitly include "conveyances." This distinction was highlighted by comparing the provisions and citing DENR v. Daraman. The Court emphasized that Article 45 of the RPC bars the confiscation of an instrument if it belongs to a third person not liable for the offense. This principle is rooted in the constitutional safeguard against deprivation of property without due process. Therefore, before a court can order the confiscation of a conveyance used in a crime, the third-party owner must be afforded due process, which includes the opportunity to present evidence of ownership and non-participation in the offense. The RTC erred in denying respondent the opportunity to prove its claim. On whether P.D. No. 705, as amended, is a special law that prevails over the Revised Penal Code: The Court held that while P.D. No. 705 is a special law, the Revised Penal Code (RPC) can be applied suppletorily by virtue of Article 10 of the RPC, unless the special law specifically provides otherwise. The Court found that P.D. No. 705 is silent on the judicial confiscation of "conveyances" used in violations thereof, making the suppletory application of Article 45 of the RPC relevant. Article 45 of the RPC provides for the confiscation and forfeiture of instruments of the crime, but it contains an exception: "unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense."
Main Doctrine
While P.D. No. 705, as amended, is a special law, Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code on confiscation and forfeiture of instruments of crime applies suppletorily, particularly when the special law is silent on the judicial confiscation of conveyances. However, Article 45 bars confiscation if the instrument is property of a third person not liable for the offense, thus requiring due process for such third parties.