People v. Causing
ABANDONMENTFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Ferdinand L. Hernandez, a Member of the House of Representatives, filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging petitioner Berteni Cataluña Causing with Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Hernandez alleged that Causing posted on Facebook on February 4, 2019, and April 29, 2019, defamatory remarks portraying him as a thief who stole public funds intended for Marawi siege victims. Procedural History: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause and filed two Informations for Cyber Libel against Causing. Causing filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that Cyber Libel is not a new crime but a mode of committing libel under the RPC, and thus prescribes in one year under paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC. He contended that the complaint was filed beyond the prescriptive period. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the Motion to Quash, holding that Cyber Libel is penalized by a special law (RA 10175) which does not provide a prescriptive period, thus Act No. 3326 applies, setting a 12-year prescriptive period. Alternatively, it reasoned that even if Article 90 of the RPC applied, the increased penalty under RA 10175 would make it prescribe in 15 years under paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC. The RTC denied Causing's Motion for Reconsideration. The Petition: Causing filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the RTC's Orders. He argued that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in applying Act No. 3326 and paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC, and that paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, providing a one-year prescriptive period for libel, should have been applied. He also challenged the binding precedent of Tolentino v. People.
Issue(s)
Whether the Petition should be dismissed outright for being an improper remedy and for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Whether Article 90 of the RPC or Section 1 of Act No. 3326 determines the prescription of Cyber Libel. Whether the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against Causing have prescribed.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the Petition for lack of merit. It affirmed the RTC's denial of the Motion to Quash, holding that prescription is a matter of defense requiring presentation of evidence. The Court ruled that Cyber Libel prescribes in one year from discovery, abandoning the Tolentino doctrine. However, it found that the prescription was not apparent on the face of the Information, and thus the RTC correctly denied the motion to quash, leaving the determination of prescription to the trial on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the procedural issues (improper remedy and hierarchy of courts): The Court acknowledged that a Petition for Certiorari is ordinarily not the proper remedy from an interlocutory order denying a motion to quash. However, it relaxed this rule due to exceptional circumstances, including the purely legal nature of the issues raised and the need to clarify conflicting jurisprudence on the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. The Court also recognized that direct resort to the Supreme Court is permissible when the issues involve the Court's role in promulgating doctrinal devices, overturning or reiterating prior rulings, especially when the case involves purely legal matters and calls for the Court's power to overturn binding precedents. The Court found that the present case warranted direct resort to address the substantive issues and provide guidance to the bench and the bar. On whether Article 90 of the RPC or Section 1 of Act No. 3326 determines the prescription of Cyber Libel: The Court ruled that Cyber Libel is not a new crime but an implementation of the RPC's provisions on libel when committed through a computer system. Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 merely identifies a computer system as a means of publication and increases the penalty by one degree. Therefore, the RPC, not Act No. 3326, governs the prescriptive period. The Court emphasized that RA 10175's direct reference to Article 355 of the RPC for the definition of the prohibited act means that the RPC's provisions on prescription should apply. The Court also noted that even if Act No. 3326 were considered, the RPC provides a shorter prescriptive period, which must be applied in favor of the accused. On whether the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against Causing have prescribed: The Court held that paragraph 4 of Article 90 of the RPC, which states that the crime of libel prescribes in one year, is controlling for Cyber Libel. This provision must be given its literal and plain meaning, as Cyber Libel is the same crime of libel under the RPC committed through a computer system. The Court abandoned the Tolentino doctrine, which applied paragraph 2 of Article 90 (15 years) based on the increased penalty. The Court reasoned that paragraph 4 is a specific provision for libel and thus prevails over the general provision on afflictive penalties. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the prescriptive period commences from the date of discovery by the offended party, authorities, or their agents, as provided in Article 91 of the RPC, not necessarily from the date of publication. Since the dates of discovery were not stated in the Informations, prescription was not apparent on the face of the charges. Therefore, the RTC correctly denied the Motion to Quash, as prescription is a matter of defense that requires presentation of evidence during trial. The Court left the determination of whether the charges have prescribed to the RTC.
Main Doctrine
The crime of Cyber Libel, as defined under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175 in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribes in one (1) year from the date of discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The ruling in Tolentino v. People which held that Cyber Libel prescribes in 15 years is abandoned.