Bohol Wisdom School v. Mabao
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondent Miraflor Mabao, a teacher at Bohol Wisdom School (BWS), was suspended by petitioners BWS, Dr. Simplicio Yap, Jr., and Raul H. Deloso, after she informed them of her two-month pregnancy, which resulted from a pre-marital relationship. BWS et al. issued a Disciplinary Form and a Letter stating that Mabao was indefinitely suspended without pay until she could present documents showing she was married to her boyfriend, citing her pre-marital relationship and subsequent pregnancy as grounds for immorality and dishonorable conduct, despite acknowledging Republic Act No. 9710 (Magna Carta for Women) which outlaws expulsion or non-readmission due to pregnancy outside marriage. 2. Procedural History: Mabao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and other monetary claims. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Mabao was constructively dismissed and ordered BWS et al. to pay her monetary awards. The NLRC reversed this decision, finding no evidence of constructive dismissal and holding that Mabao's suspension was not tantamount to dismissal. Mabao then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the NLRC's finding of no constructive dismissal but modified the ruling, holding that Mabao was illegally suspended and ordering BWS et al. to pay her backwages, certain allowances, and attorney's fees. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied. BWS et al. then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. 3. The Petition: Petitioners BWS et al. seek review of the CA's decision, agreeing that Mabao was not constructively dismissed but disagreeing with the finding of illegal suspension. They argue that Mabao's suspension was a valid exercise of management prerogative, based on their school's standard of morality, and that procedural due process was substantially followed as Mabao admitted her violation and agreed to the suspension. They contend that Mabao is not entitled to backwages, 13th month pay, and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court, however, finds that the CA erred in its determination of the end of Mabao's employment, but agrees that the suspension was illegal. The Court also finds that Mabao abandoned her employment, with her employment ending on November 9, 2016, the date she expressed her intention not to return to work.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent Miraflor Mabao was constructively dismissed. Whether respondent Miraflor Mabao was illegally suspended, including a consideration of procedural due process. Whether respondent Miraflor Mabao abandoned her employment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari, affirming the Court of Appeals' finding that Miraflor Mabao was not constructively dismissed but was illegally suspended. However, the Court modified the CA's ruling regarding the end of Mabao's employment, holding that her employment ended on November 9, 2016, due to abandonment of work, not November 25, 2016. Consequently, the monetary awards were ordered to accrue only until November 9, 2016.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of constructive dismissal: The Court affirmed the CA's finding that Mabao was not constructively dismissed. The evidence showed that BWS intended for Mabao to return to work after her marriage, as indicated by the return-to-work notices. The term "indefinite suspension" used by BWS was predicated on the expected date of Mabao's marriage, not an intent to permanently sever employment. The Court found no overt act on the part of BWS to prove an intent to dismiss Mabao; rather, BWS made efforts to have her return. On the issue of illegal suspension and procedural due process: The Court ruled that Mabao's suspension was illegal. The basis for the suspension was Mabao's pregnancy outside of wedlock due to pre-marital sex, which BWS considered an immoral act based on its religious standards. However, the Court reiterated that the standard of morality in the eyes of the law is public and secular, not religious. Premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no legal impediment to marry are not considered disgraceful or immoral under public and secular morality, nor do they contravene any fundamental state policy. Therefore, the suspension based on this ground lacked substantive basis. Furthermore, the Court found that BWS failed to comply with procedural due process. It was undisputed that BWS did not issue a notice to explain before suspending Mabao. The Court noted that the Administrative Team had already decided on Mabao's suspension prior to hearing her side, thus precluding any claim of substantial compliance with the requirement of notice and hearing. The suspension was therefore procedurally infirm. On the issue of abandonment of work: The Court found that Mabao abandoned her employment. Despite receiving several return-to-work notices from BWS, she refused to report back. Her letter dated November 9, 2016, unequivocally stated her intention not to return to work for the school, which constituted an overt act manifesting her clear intent to sever employment. This, coupled with her failure to return after her marriage and her prayer for separation pay, supported the conclusion of abandonment. Consequently, her employment ended on November 9, 2016, the date she expressed her intent not to return.
Main Doctrine
A school's imposition of an indefinite suspension on a teacher due to pregnancy outside of marriage, based on its religious or sectarian moral standards, is illegal. Such suspension violates both substantive due process, as premarital sex is not considered immoral under public and secular morality, and procedural due process, for failure to issue a notice to explain. However, if the employee unequivocally expresses an intention not to return to work despite notices, it constitutes abandonment.