People v. Borinaga
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Harry H. Mooney contracted with Juan Lawaan, associated with Basilio Borinaga, for the construction of a fish corral. On March 4, 1929, Lawaan demanded full payment despite only two-thirds completion, which Mooney refused. Lawaan threatened Mooney, who responded by suggesting they wait until after breakfast. Later that evening, while Mooney was in a neighbor's store with his back to the window, Borinaga struck at Mooney with a knife from the window. The knife lodged in the back of Mooney's chair, causing him to fall but not injure him. Borinaga fled but was heard to say he would stab Mooney and later that he missed. Approximately ten minutes later, Borinaga returned with a knife to attack again but was deterred when Mooney and the neighbor turned a flashlight on him. Borinaga was again overheard stating he missed his mark and could not deliver another blow due to the flashlight. The knife point was found embedded in the chair. Procedural History: Basilio Borinaga was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for frustrated murder. The defense of alibi was not credited. The accused was convicted and sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, with accessory penalties and costs. The Petition: The accused appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Issue(s)
Whether the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder under Article 3 of the Penal Code. Whether the presence of treachery qualifies the crime as murder.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding that the crime committed was frustrated murder, not attempted murder. The Court sentenced the appellant to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, with accessory penalties and costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of frustrated murder versus attempted murder: The Court held that the facts constituted frustrated murder. The essential condition for a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, was met. The Court reasoned that nothing remained to be done to accomplish the assailant's work completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose from forces independent of the perpetrator's will, specifically the chair frame preventing the knife from reaching Mooney's body. The Court emphasized that the subjective phase of the criminal act had been passed, distinguishing it from a situation where the offender voluntarily desists. The Court cited U.S. vs. Eduave and People vs. Mabugat in support of its reasoning regarding the subjective phase and the performance of all acts of execution. On the issue of treachery: The Court found that the homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced and that the attendant circumstances conclusively established murder in the mind of the accused. The Court noted that more than mere menaces took place, the aggressor stated his purpose to kill, a deadly weapon was used, and the blow was directed treacherously toward vital organs. The means used were suitable for accomplishment, thus warranting the qualification of murder due to the presence of treachery.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that when an offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce a felony as a consequence, but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, the crime is frustrated, even if the victim is not injured, provided the subjective phase of the criminal act has been passed.