Teng v. Teng

G.R. No. 277015 · 2025-02-17 · J. INTING, J.: · Primary: Commercial; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: This case originated from an intra-corporate dispute initiated by Alvin Clark Y. Teng (Alvin) against Pearly Y. Teng, Albert Y. Teng, Paul T. Teng, and Cheryl Ann T. Hao, who are members of the Board of Directors of Mabuhay Educational Center, Inc. (MECI). Alvin sought to prevent the respondents from terminating MECI's business operations, conducting further board meetings, and selling MECI's property. Alvin alleged that he was part of MECI's Board of Directors and managed its daily operations from 2002 to 2017. He claimed that on December 20, 2017, the respondents elected themselves as officers and directors, despite MECI's By-Laws requiring five directors and Alvin's nomination of his mother, Elena Y. Teng, for a directorship. Alvin further alleged that the respondents removed him as a bank signatory and subsequently issued a notice for a stockholders' meeting on April 16, 2018, with less than the required notice period, to discuss the closure and sale of MECI's assets. Alvin contended that these actions constituted fraudulent schemes, including his surreptitious removal as corporate secretary, the gradual termination of business operations, and bad faith negotiations regarding the distribution of MECI's income and assets. Procedural History: Alvin filed his initial action on April 13, 2018, seeking injunctive relief. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, Quezon City, dismissed both Alvin's complaint and the respondents' counterclaim in a Decision dated August 15, 2022. The RTC found that Alvin's allegations did not sufficiently establish fraud, noting that the closure of a company and sale of assets are permissible under the Corporation Code and the business judgment rule. The RTC also held that Alvin waived his right to question the December 20, 2017 meeting due to his participation, that MECI's By-Laws did not mandate five directors, and that the notice period for the April 16, 2018 meeting was not a basis for fraud. Unsatisfied, Alvin elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review. The CA, in its Decision dated February 26, 2024, affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto, agreeing that Alvin failed to present clear and convincing evidence of fraud and that he was estopped from questioning the December 20, 2017 meeting due to his participation. The CA also found the meeting to be an ultra vires act that was subsequently ratified and that the respondents' actions were valid exercises of their corporate powers. Alvin's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 21, 2024. The Petition: Alvin Clark Y. Teng filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA's Decision and Resolution. Alvin argues that the CA erred in ruling that the December 20, 2017, special stockholders' and organizational meeting was ratified at the March 1, 2018 special board meeting, contending that only stockholders can ratify decisions made at a stockholders' meeting. He also maintains that the CA erred in finding that his allegations of fraud were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, specifically highlighting the lack of notice for the December 20, 2017 meeting and the purported waiver of notice being only in writing per MECI's By-Laws. Furthermore, Alvin argues that the dissolution of MECI or its cessation of business operations did not comply with the procedural requirements of Section 118 of the Corporation Code, and therefore, he is entitled to a writ of injunction. The petition seeks to reverse the CA's dismissal of his petition for review and denial of his prayer for a permanent injunction.

Issue(s)

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the December 20, 2017, special stockholders' and organizational meeting was ratified at the March 1, 2018 special board meeting. Whether the CA erred in ruling that Alvin's allegations of fraud were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Whether the CA erred in denying Alvin's prayer for a permanent injunction.

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Court affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the dismissal of Alvin's intra-corporate action and denied his prayer for a permanent injunction.

Ratio Decidendi

On the ratification of the December 20, 2017 meeting: The Court noted that while Alvin correctly pointed out that a board meeting cannot ratify the election of directors, which is a stockholders' prerogative under Section 24 of the Old Corporation Code, any defect in the election of respondents as directors and officers was rendered moot by their re-election during the annual stockholders' meeting on April 16, 2018. Furthermore, Alvin's action to nullify the December 20, 2017 meeting constituted an election contest, subject to a 15-day prescriptive period under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. Since Alvin filed his action on April 13, 2018, well beyond the 15-day period, he was barred from questioning the election, rendering the issue of notice moot. On Alvin's allegations of fraud: The Court reiterated that fraud is never presumed and must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Alvin's allegations of fraudulent schemes were not supported by sufficient factual allegations. The actions attributed to respondents, such as the removal of a director or officer, cessation of operations, and sale of corporate property, are permitted under the Corporation Code, provided statutory voting requirements are met. Alvin's removal as corporate secretary was in accordance with MECI's By-Laws, which state that the secretary serves at the pleasure of the board. The Court also found no motive for fraud, given Alvin's minuscule 2% shareholding compared to the respondents' majority. The election of only four directors was justified as Alvin's nominee, Elena, was not a stockholder and thus not qualified. On the denial of the permanent injunction: The Court distinguished between corporate dissolution and cessation of business operations. Cessation of operations is a management decision under the business judgment rule, falling within the board's discretion, and does not require stockholders' approval unless provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws. The records showed MECI merely ceased operations due to the intra-corporate controversy, not dissolution. The Court cannot compel respondents to resume operations or enjoin them from selling the property, as these are management decisions protected by the business judgment rule. The power to hold board meetings is also inherent in the BOD's role. Therefore, the courts a quo correctly denied Alvin's prayer for a writ of injunction.

Main Doctrine

The cessation of business operations is a management decision falling within the business judgment of the board of directors, and does not equate to corporate dissolution. Allegations of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Actions contesting the validity of elections are subject to a strict prescriptive period.

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