Llorente v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Atty. David P. Llorente, Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services, Finance Services, and Legal Affairs Departments of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), was employed from 1975 to August 31, 1986. In 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned due to reorganization, including Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, Mrs. Javier, and Mr. Curio, who were required to secure PCA clearances for their gratuity benefits, a condition of which was the absence of pending accountabilities or their full settlement. Mrs. Perez and Mr. Azucena obtained clearances on October 30, 1981, despite pending GSIS and UCPB accountabilities deducted from their benefits. Mrs. Javier's clearance of the same date also showed unsettled obligations totaling P25,092.00, deducted from her benefits released on November 16, 1981, with a P92,000.00 portion of cash advances, primarily hers, disallowed and deducted. Mr. Curio executed an affidavit on November 26, 1981, assuming responsibility for any disallowed portion of these cash advances. Mr. Curio's clearance, dated November 4, 1981, showed pending accountabilities totaling P10,714.78; despite Mrs. Sotto's notation, she signed it. However, Atty. Llorente refused to approve it on December 8, 1981, citing Mr. Curio's assumption of residual liability for the P92,000.00 disallowed cash advances and other pending obligations, invoking Condition (a) of the clearance as stringent. Mr. Curio's clearance remained unapproved for years, preventing him from receiving benefits and securing other employment. He filed a case with the Tanodbayan, leading to the instant case. On November 21, 1986, Mr. Curio obtained a new clearance, approved despite unsettled accountabilities, and his gratuity benefits were released, with the P92,000.00 disallowed cash advances reduced to P55,000.00. Mr. Curio suffered damages due to his inability to secure employment from 1981 to 1986, impacting his family's livelihood and his ability to secure permanent employment due to his age. Procedural History: An Information for violation of Section 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against Atty. Llorente. The Sandiganbayan acquitted him of the criminal charge, finding no evidence of bad faith. However, the Sandiganbayan held him civilly liable for abuse of right under Article 19 and Article 27 of the Civil Code, ordering him to pay P90,000.00 in compensatory damages. The Petition: The petition questions the Sandiganbayan's decision holding him civilly liable despite his acquittal in the criminal case, arguing that he was not in bad faith.
Issue(s)
Whether Atty. Llorente can be held civilly liable for damages despite his acquittal in the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and what is the justification for civil liability and the award of damages. Whether Atty. Llorente's refusal to issue a clearance to Mr. Curio constituted an abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code and Article 27 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioner Atty. David P. Llorente civilly liable for damages is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of civil liability despite acquittal, justification for civil liability, and the award of damages: The Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's finding that Atty. Llorente did not act with "evident bad faith," an element required for conviction under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3819 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). However, the Court reiterated that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a civil liability finding can be made in an acquittal case, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. The Court cited Article 29 of the Civil Code, stating that if acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action still lies. Therefore, the acquittal in the criminal case did not automatically preclude a finding of civil liability. The Court emphasized that the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code is the performance of duty with justice and good faith. Atty. Llorente's actions were not done in good faith because he unjustly discriminated against Mr. Curio by not following the established office practice that he had previously applied to other employees. This unfair treatment, even if he was technically following a rule, led to Mr. Curio's inability to receive his gratuity benefits and secure employment, causing him damages. The Court cited Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Philippines and Sevilla v. Court of Appeals to support the principle that legal acts performed in bad faith or to unjustly deprive another of their rights can lead to liability under Article 19. The Court found the award of P90,000.00 in compensatory damages justified under Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which holds a defendant liable for all "natural and probable" damages. Mr. Curio presented evidence that the petitioner's refusal to clear him directly resulted in his failure to secure employment at the Philippine Cotton Authority and Philippine First Marketing Authority. These positions would have provided him with a monthly salary of P2,500.00. Calculating potential earnings over five years (P150,000.00) and deducting estimated expenses (P60,000.00), the Court arrived at actual damages of P90,000.00, which the petitioner was ordered to pay. On the issue of abuse of right under Article 19 and Article 27 of the Civil Code: The Court found that Atty. Llorente, despite not acting with "evident bad faith" in the criminal sense, did act with bad faith in a civil context, constituting an abuse of right. The established office practice at the PCA was to allow clearances and deduct pending obligations from gratuity benefits. Atty. Llorente was aware of this practice, having approved clearances for Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs. Javier under similar circumstances where their obligations were deducted. His strict adherence to Condition (a) only in Mr. Curio's case, while ignoring it for others similarly situated, demonstrated unjust discrimination and unfairness. This selective application of rules, despite the existence of an office practice, amounted to acting within the bounds of law but not in good faith, thereby constituting an abuse of right.
Main Doctrine
While acquittal in a criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act may be based on lack of evident bad faith, civil liability may still attach if the public officer's actions, though not constituting evident bad faith, were performed in bad faith or constituted an abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code, especially when such actions caused undue injury to another.