Guingona v. Carague
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, Senators Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., questioned the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The 1990 budget comprised P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion under the General Appropriations Act (RA 6831), totaling P233.5 Billion. The automatic appropriation was authorized by P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. Procedural History: The case was filed before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioners sought the declaration of unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967, and to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to these decrees. They argued that these decrees became functus officio after the ouster of President Marcos, that they are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution, and that they constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue(s)
Whether the appropriation of P86 Billion for debt service in the 1990 budget violates Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution regarding the highest budgetary priority for education. Whether P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967 are still operative under the 1987 Constitution. Whether these decrees violate Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution regarding appropriations made by law. Whether the said decrees constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the appropriation for debt service violates Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution: The Court held that while Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, this does not prevent Congress from responding to the imperatives of national interest and other state policies. The budget for education in 1990 was the highest among all departments, demonstrating compliance with the mandate. The Court found that the appropriation for debt service, though larger than that for education, was a reasonable provision to service the country's enormous debt, protect its credit standing, and ensure economic survival. Therefore, the appropriation for debt service cannot be assailed as unconstitutional on this ground. On the issue of whether P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967 are still operative under the 1987 Constitution: The Court ruled that Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution explicitly states that all existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. The Court found that these decrees were not inconsistent with the Constitution and that their purpose of ensuring timely payment of debt service without the necessity of periodic legislative enactments was preserved. The argument that these decrees expired with President Marcos was rejected, as the purpose of the laws was to subsist independently of the person of the president. On the issue of whether these decrees violate Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution: The Court held that the argument that these decrees, being presidential issuances, are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative process is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not intend to invalidate existing laws and decrees that already provide for appropriations. The provisions of Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI, which refer to "bills," were interpreted to mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. Repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon, and constitutional and legal constructions are generally applied prospectively. The questioned decrees constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations unless repealed or amended by Congress. On the issue of undue delegation of legislative power: The Court reiterated the principle that what cannot be delegated is the authority to make laws. The test for undue delegation is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislature. The Court found that the questioned laws (R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967) were complete in their essential terms and conditions, and sufficient standards were indicated. The legislative intention was to automatically set aside amounts needed for debt service to protect the country's credit standing. While specific amounts were not stated, they were made certain by legislative parameters, limited to the exact amounts of principal, interest, taxes, and other banking charges as shown by the Treasury's books. This did not constitute an unlimited discretion for the Executive.
Main Doctrine
Automatic appropriations for debt service authorized by existing laws, decrees, and executive issuances are constitutional and operative until amended, repealed, or revoked, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. Such appropriations do not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power as the legislative intent, parameters, and standards are sufficiently indicated.