Aldovino v. Alunan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners and intervenors assert that their situation mirrors that of employees in previous cases, Mandani v. Gonzales and the consolidated cases of Abrogar v. Garrucho, Jr. and Arnaldo v. Garrucho, Jr., where employees were separated from service following the reorganization of the Ministry of Tourism (now Department of Tourism) under Executive Order No. 120. This executive order, effective January 30, 1987, stipulated that positions not included in the new structure or whose incumbents were not reappointed were deemed vacant, leading to the termination of many employees. The petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages, arguing they should receive the same relief granted to their former colleagues. Procedural History: Following the issuance of Executive Order No. 120, the Ministry of Tourism declared numerous positions vacant and effected the separation of employees. This led to the aforementioned cases of Mandani, Abrogar, and Arnaldo, wherein this Court declared the separation orders void and directed reinstatement with back pay. The instant petition and subsequent interventions were filed by employees who claimed to have been similarly affected by the voided reorganization. The respondents, however, argued against the petition, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies, laches, and potential disruption to the current organizational structure. The Solicitor General specifically raised the issue of prescription, asserting that the petition and interventions were filed beyond the statutory period. The Petition: The petitioners and intervenors, through a petition and subsequent interventions, seek reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries, computed under the new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissals. They contend that their separation from service was a direct consequence of office orders and memoranda that were subsequently declared void in prior Supreme Court decisions. The core of their argument is that they should not be deprived of the relief granted to similarly situated employees. They also argue against the application of laches and prescription, citing their continued protests, attempts to seek administrative remedies, and the government's own role in the delay. They further assert that the principle of equity should prevail, especially given the unconstitutional nature of their dismissal and the lack of timely objection to prescription by the respondents.
Issue(s)
Whether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was pursuant to office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani. Whether the claims of petitioners and intervenors are barred by laches. Whether the claims of petitioners and intervenors are barred by prescription. Whether petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros, Efren Fontanilla, and intervenor Concepcion Timario are entitled to relief. Whether the claims of intervenors Rizalina P. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin, Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando Cruz, Catalino Dabu, Francisco Villaraiz, Norma Jumilia, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca, and Alfonso Angeles for back wages should be granted; and whether the claims of temporary and casual employees should be granted. How back wages should be computed.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. Petitioners and intervenors are ordered REINSTATED immediately to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under the new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissals at rates not lower than their former salaries but not to exceed a period of five (5) years, provided no supervening event disqualifies them and any benefits received are reimbursed through reasonable salary deductions. Public respondents are also ordered to pay back salaries to intervenors Rizalina P. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin, Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando Cruz, Catalino Dabu, Francisco Villaraiz, Norma Jumilia, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca, and Alfonso Angeles under similar conditions. The petition of Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros, and Efren Fontanilla, and the intervention of Concepcion Timario are DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of separation orders: The Court reiterated that office orders and memoranda issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 120, which were declared void in Mandani v. Gonzales, were indeed the basis for the separation of most of the petitioners and intervenors. The Court found that public respondents did not dispute this fact for most of the claimants, except for a few individuals whose specific cases were addressed separately. On the defense of laches: The Court held that laches, which is principally a question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced due to delay, must lean in favor of petitioners and intervenors who were unjustly injured by unlawful acts. The prejudice from the violation of their rights was deemed far more serious than any inconvenience to public respondents in rectifying their mistakes. The Court considered the unrebutted allegations of petitioners and intervenors regarding their protests, complaints filed with DOLE and CSC, participation in pickets, and receipt of benefits under protest as evidence that they did not sleep on their rights. On the defense of prescription: The Court emphasized that prescription was never raised as an issue by public respondents and was therefore deemed waived. Even if it were considered, the Court held that it must yield to the higher interest of justice, particularly in cases involving the employment of individuals. The Court cited Fernandez v. Grolier International, Inc. and Director of Lands v. Dano to support the principle that the statute of limitations is waived if not pleaded. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Solicitor General argued laches, not prescription, and that the period of prescription was tolled by the filing of cases before DOLE and CSC and by the written demands made by terminated employees. On specific claims of petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros, Efren Fontanilla, and intervenor Concepcion Timario: The Court dismissed the petition of Samuel Hipol because his separation was under a different proclamation, not E.O. 120, and he was not an incumbent when E.O. 120 was issued. Concepcion Timario's intervention was dismissed because her resignation was voluntary and cited professional reasons, not a courtesy resignation under void orders. The claims of Jane Corros and Efren Fontanilla were remanded for further fact-finding as their employment status was disputed. The Court noted that the listing in the plantilla is not conclusive evidence of employment. On claims for back wages of reinstated intervenors and claims of temporary and casual employees: The Court granted the claims for back wages of intervenors Rizalina P. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin, Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando Cruz, Catalino Dabu, Francisco Villaraiz, Norma Jumilia, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca, and Alfonso Angeles, as they were already reinstated but not paid their back wages. The Court acknowledged that casual and temporary employees' appointments are terminable at pleasure. However, since the orders of separation were annulled, the effect was as if the termination did not occur. Nevertheless, the reinstatement of Myrna Salvador, Ascension Padilla, and Evelyn Enriquez could not be ordered in the instant proceeding as the determination was limited to the nullity of the orders. On the computation of back wages: The Court ruled that the award of back wages should not exceed a period of five (5) years, conforming to existing jurisprudence, and that any benefits received by reason of termination must be reimbursed through reasonable salary deductions. The Court also reiterated that an unconstitutional act is inoperative and considered as if it had not been passed, meaning the petitioners and intervenors were as if never separated from service.
Main Doctrine
Employees illegally dismissed due to an unconstitutional reorganization are entitled to reinstatement and back wages, and the defenses of laches and prescription may be deemed waived if not timely and properly raised, especially when considerations of substantial justice are involved.