Manalo v. Gloria

G.R. No. 106692 · 1994-09-01 · J. DAVIDE, JR., J.: · Primary: Administrative Law; Secondary: Civil Service
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Mila Manalo was employed as a Planning Assistant at the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI). Executive Order No. 128 reorganized the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), leading to the reorganization of PNRI and the abolition of certain positions, including petitioner's. Petitioner appealed to be placed in a comparable position and was subsequently appointed as Clerk II on May 15, 1989, which she accepted. Procedural History: Petitioner requested back salaries from her dismissal date (April 16, 1988) to her reinstatement date (June 14, 1989) and salary equivalent to her former position. The DOST denied this request, stating she was not a party to G.R. No. 81495 (Arizabal vs. Leviste) and there was no finding of illegal termination. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) also denied her request, citing her non-party status in Arizabal and her voluntary acceptance of the Clerk II position. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to nullify the DOST's 1st Indorsement and the CSC's Resolution, and to order payment of back wages and salary differential.

Issue(s)

Whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the petitioner is entitled to back wages and salary differential despite voluntarily accepting a new position after her former position was abolished due to reorganization; and whether the petitioner can claim execution of the decision in Arizabal vs. Leviste. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy for the petitioner's claims; and whether the petitioner properly observed the hierarchy of courts.

Ruling

The petition is DISMISSED. The Court found that the petition was filed out of time and that the petitioner, by voluntarily accepting a new position without reservation, was barred by estoppel from claiming back wages and salary differential. Mandamus was also deemed an inappropriate remedy for the claims presented.

Ratio Decidendi

On the timeliness of the petition: The Court held that the petitioner received the CSC Resolution on September 5, 1991. Pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, she had thirty days from receipt to file a petition for certiorari. The instant petition was filed on September 3, 1992, eleven months and twenty-eight days later, which is indisputably beyond the constitutionally mandated period. On this ground alone, the petition must be dismissed. On the merits of the claims for back wages and salary differential, and the applicability of Arizabal vs. Leviste: The Court found that the petitioner's position was abolished due to a valid reorganization under E.O. No. 128. While she appealed for placement in a comparable position, she voluntarily accepted the appointment as Clerk II without reservation. The Court noted that she did not assert any reluctance or involuntariness in her acceptance. Therefore, estoppel bars her from claiming back wages for the period she was not employed and the salary differential between her former position and the Clerk II position she accepted. The Court reiterated that the petitioner was not a party to G.R. No. 81495 (Arizabal vs. Leviste) and therefore could not claim execution of that decision. The Court distinguished the petitioner's situation from that in Cristobal vs. Melchor, where the petitioner persistently sought reinstatement and was assured of it, unlike the petitioner here who accepted a new position without reservation. On the propriety of mandamus, and the hierarchy of courts: The Court stated that mandamus is available when a tribunal or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes a person from a right or office. The petitioner's claim for back wages could be the subject of an ordinary civil action, and there was no showing that such remedy was not plain, speedy, and adequate. Furthermore, her claim for salary equivalent to her former position was barred by estoppel due to her voluntary acceptance of the Clerk II position. The Court emphasized its policy, as laid down in People vs. Cuaresma and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, to dismiss petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court when the same relief can be obtained from lower courts, unless there are special and important reasons justifying direct resort. The petitioner failed to demonstrate such exceptional circumstances.

Main Doctrine

A petition for certiorari must be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Failure to do so warrants dismissal. Furthermore, an employee who voluntarily accepts a new position, even if lower in rank and salary, without reservation, is barred by estoppel from claiming back wages or salary equivalent to their former position.

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