Marcos v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, born in Manila, spent her formative years in Tacloban, Leyte, her domicile of origin. Her marriage in 1954 to Ferdinand E. Marcos led to residences in various locations, including Ilocos Norte, San Juan, and Manila, where she registered as a voter. Following her husband's death, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 and ran for President in 1992, declaring San Juan, Metro Manila as her residence. In August 1994, she canceled her San Juan voter registration to transfer to Tolosa, Leyte. Procedural History: On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating a seven-month period of residence. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo petitioned the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify her for failing to meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. An amended COC, changing the residency entry to 'since childhood,' was filed after the deadline. The COMELEC's Second Division and subsequently the COMELEC en banc disqualified petitioner, deeming the 'seven months' entry a factual admission and concluding she had abandoned her domicile of origin in Leyte. Despite winning the May 8, 1995 elections overwhelmingly, the COMELEC suspended her proclamation. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. She contended she met the one-year residency requirement, asserting her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte was never abandoned and that the COC entry was an 'honest misinterpretation.' Additionally, she raised jurisdictional arguments, claiming the COMELEC's authority had expired and jurisdiction had transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) post-election.
Issue(s)
Whether or not petitioner satisfied the constitutional requirement of residence in the First District of Leyte for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election. Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying the petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code. Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of residence: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement. The Court reiterated the settled doctrine that for election purposes, 'residence' is synonymous with 'domicile,' which is one's permanent home with the intention to return (animus revertendi). Domicile of origin is not easily lost and requires clear proof of abandonment. The Court found that petitioner's various residences in Manila and other places were temporary and did not constitute an abandonment of her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. While her marriage to Ferdinand Marcos caused her to acquire his domicile by operation of law (domicilium necessarium), this did not extinguish her original domicile. Upon her husband's death, she was free to revert to her domicile of origin, which her actions demonstrated. The Court deemed the 'seven months' entry in her COC an 'honest mistake' arising from confusion between her actual physical residence in Tolosa and her legal domicile in the First District, holding that the fact of residence, not the statement in the COC, is decisive. On the issue of COMELEC's jurisdiction before the election: The Court held that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction to decide the case even if it was resolved beyond the period prescribed in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Citing Marcelino v. Cruz, the Court explained that a statute requiring the rendition of a judgment within a specified time is generally construed as merely directory, not mandatory. Non-compliance with such a period does not invalidate the judgment or divest the body of its jurisdiction. To rule otherwise would allow quasi-judicial bodies to evade their duty to decide cases. On the issue of HRET's jurisdiction after the election: The Court ruled that the HRET had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the matter. The HRET's jurisdiction as the 'sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications' of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has been proclaimed and has become a member of the House of Representatives. Since the petitioner's proclamation was suspended, she was not yet a member of the House. Therefore, the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to resolve the pending disqualification case against her.
Main Doctrine
For purposes of election law, the constitutional requirement of 'residence' is synonymous with 'domicile,' which refers to an individual's permanent home to which they intend to return. Domicile of origin is not easily lost and requires clear and positive proof of an intention to abandon it (animus non revertendi). An entry in a Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of residence is not conclusive and can be overcome by evidence establishing the fact of domicile for the required period; an honest mistake in such an entry does not negate a candidate's qualification. Furthermore, a widow is not perpetually bound by the domicile her husband established during the marriage; upon his death, she is free to revert to her domicile of origin.