Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Brillantes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents, the National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU) and its local chapter Marcopper Employees Labor Union (MELU), filed a preventive mediation case against petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation (petitioner) alleging unfair labor practices, including violation of the collective bargaining agreement and discrimination in the grant of profit bonuses. After conciliation proceedings failed, the union filed a Notice of Strike. The union subsequently filed a second Notice of Strike, adding union busting as a ground. Petitioner filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Procedural History: On February 24, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued an order certifying the dispute for compulsory arbitration under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, enjoining any strike or lockout, and directing parties to cease and desist from exacerbating the dispute. Despite receipt of this order, the union went on strike on February 27, 1995. The Secretary of Labor issued a second order on February 28, 1995, reiterating the return-to-work directive and ordering management to accept returning workers under the same terms and conditions. The union filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 9, 1995. On March 10, 1995, the union signified willingness to abide by the order but claimed petitioner refused to accept the workers, praying for their reinstatement. On March 20, 1995, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued the assailed order directing petitioner to accept back all returning workers. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the March 20, 1995 order, arguing that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in ordering the acceptance of workers who defied the return-to-work order. Petitioner prayed for the setting aside of the order and a declaration that the employees were legally dismissed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Acting Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in ordering petitioner to accept workers who defied the return-to-work order. Whether employees who failed to return to work after a certification order and a subsequent return-to-work directive are deemed to have abandoned their employment and can be validly replaced.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The order of respondent Acting Secretary of Labor dated March 20, 1995, is set aside insofar as it directs petitioner to accept, pending resolution of the issues raised in the compulsory arbitration proceedings before the NLRC, all returning workers under the same terms and conditions prior to the work stoppage. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is directed to expedite the compulsory arbitration proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court found that the Secretary of Labor, while intending to maintain the status quo pending arbitration, failed to consider the factual findings regarding the union's actuations subsequent to the certification order. The Court noted that the union went on strike despite the immediately executory nature of the certification order and the subsequent return-to-work directive. The Court emphasized that a return-to-work order is a statutory part and parcel of the Secretary's assumption or certification order under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Failure to comply with such an order is not a matter of option but of obligation, with the sanction being loss of employment status. The Court cannot countenance the Secretary's tolerance of the union's willful breach and defiance, as it would be unfair to compel the petitioner to accept workers who refused to return to work pending arbitration. On Issue 2: The Court reiterated its established jurisprudence that workers who stage a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration forfeit their right to be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and thus can be validly replaced. This is a consequence of their failure to comply with the obligation to return to work as mandated by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The Court cited previous rulings in St. Scholastica's College v. Torres, Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, and Sarmiento v. Tuico to support this principle. Therefore, the employees who failed to heed the return-to-work notices, despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration and the subsequent order to accept workers, were deemed to have abandoned their employment.
Main Doctrine
A return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code is immediately executory, and failure of striking workers to comply therewith results in the loss of their employment status, rendering them ineligible for reinstatement pending arbitration.