Domingo v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Rodolfo M. Cuenca (CDCP president), and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr. Petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo (PNB President) was later impleaded after a subpoena was returned unserved. The complaint was docketed as TBP Case No. 87-02391. Procedural History: Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped Ferdinand Marcos from the complaint to avoid delay. Domingo was later directed to submit a counter-affidavit. A resolution recommended prosecution of Domingo and Cuenca for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, while dismissing the case against Marcos (due to death) and Venus (lack of merit). An information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Domingo filed a petition for reinvestigation, treated as a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Subsequently, Domingo filed a motion to quash the information, alleging prescription and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion. Domingo then filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The Petition: Petitioner Domingo sought to nullify the Sandiganbayan's resolution denying his motion to quash, arguing that the criminal action had prescribed and the facts charged did not constitute an offense. He also invoked his right to speedy trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the criminal action against petitioner has been extinguished by prescription. Whether the facts charged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. Whether the delay in the preliminary investigation and filing of the information violated petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan's Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Quash is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. No. 3019 is ten years, increased to fifteen years by B.P. Blg. 195. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the commencement and interruption of prescription for violations of special laws. The prescriptive period begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or from the discovery thereof if not known at the time. In this case, the alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution, as the government was the aggrieved party and the transactions involved alleged conspiracy. Therefore, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery, between February 1986 and May 26, 1987, when the complaint was filed. The prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. Whether tolled on September 1, 1987 (when impleaded) or July 30, 1992 (when information filed), only about one or six years had elapsed from the discovery, thus the prescriptive period had not lapsed. The motion to quash on this ground was correctly denied. On whether the facts charged constitute an offense: The Court reiterated that a motion to quash on this ground must be resolved based on the allegations in the information, which are hypothetically admitted. The elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are: (1) the accused is a public officer or a private person in conspiracy with one; (2) the offense is committed during performance of official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) undue injury to any party; (4) unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference given to a party; and (5) manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The information alleged that Domingo, as PNB President, facilitated the approval of a US$40 Million Letter of Credit and waived collateral requirements for CDCP, causing undue injury to PNB (forced to assume CDCP's US$29 Million obligation) and granting unwarranted benefits to CDCP. It also alleged that Domingo acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. These allegations sufficiently established the elements of the offense, thus the motion to quash was correctly denied. On the right to speedy disposition of cases: The Court stated that the concept of speedy disposition is relative and flexible, requiring a balancing of factors: length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right by the accused, and prejudice caused. The Court found that the delay was adequately explained by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, citing the questioning of its authority, the issuance of Administrative Order No. 1, the retirement of a prosecutor, reorganization of the office, and the need to give Domingo an opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit after the initial subpoena was unserved. The delay was not undue or intended to prejudice the accused, but rather afforded him an opportunity to refute the charges. Therefore, the right to speedy disposition was not violated.
Main Doctrine
The Sandiganbayan correctly denied the motion to quash the information on the grounds of prescription and failure to constitute an offense, as the allegations sufficiently established the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and the delay in preliminary investigation was justified.