Republic v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan against Lucio Tan, the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, and several others, for "Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages." The complaint alleged that Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos systematically accumulated wealth in violation of the Constitution and in fraud of the Filipino people, including an agreement with Lucio C. Tan for Marcos to own 60% of Shareholdings, Inc., a holding company controlling Tan's corporations. It also alleged that Tan paid bribes to Marcos and that they used other defendants as fronts. The complaint further alleged that Tan, with assistance from Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, gained control of General Bank and Trust Company (which became Allied Banking Corporation) without sufficient collateral. Additionally, the Marcos spouses and Tan allegedly caused losses to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) by unlawfully selling DBP's controlling interest in Century Park Sheraton Hotel Manila to an undercapitalized company beneficially held by Tan, a transaction facilitated by DBP Vice-Chairman Don Ferry and Harry Tan. Procedural History: Petitioner filed an Expanded Complaint and later a Second Amended Complaint, substituting Ferdinand Marcos with his estate and impleading additional defendants, including Panfilo O. Domingo, the Estate of Gregorio Licaros, Cesar Zalamea, and 42 corporations. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Second Amended Complaint. Some defendants filed motions for a more definite statement or bill of particulars. Petitioner then filed a "Motion for Leave To Take the Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud Upon Oral Examination In the Crown Colony of Hongkong," alleging Gapud, former financial adviser to President Marcos, was willing to testify on matters relevant to the case and had executed sworn statements in Hongkong detailing the business activities of the Marcoses and their associates, including Lucio Tan. Petitioner argued that Gapud's testimony was indispensable but that he feared for his safety and would only testify by deposition. The Petition: The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for leave to take deposition, citing that not all defendants had been summoned or had filed answers, and no special circumstances warranted the deposition. Reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion on grounds of prematurity and lack of special circumstances, and in stating that no unavailability of the witness was alleged.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's Motion for Leave to Take the Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud. Whether the taking of the deposition of Rolando C. Gapud was premature due to the non-joinder of issues. Whether special or unusual circumstances existed to warrant the taking of the deposition before the joinder of issues.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the Resolutions dated August 23, 1993, and October 22, 1993, of the Sandiganbayan are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court affirmed that trial courts have the power to deny a deposition if valid reasons exist. The reasons presented by the petitioner did not rise to the level of "exceptional" or "unusual" cases that would warrant reversing the Sandiganbayan's discretionary ruling. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying the motion for leave to take the deposition. On the issue of prematurity: The Court reiterated that under Rule 24, Section 1 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a deposition pending action may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant, or without leave of court after an answer has been served. Leave of court is required when issues have not yet been joined because the disputed facts are not clear. In this case, not all defendants had been summoned or had filed their answers to the Second Amended Complaint, and the issues were not yet joined. Therefore, the requirement of leave of court was applicable. On the existence of special circumstances and unavailability of the witness: The Court held that while depositions may be allowed before the service of an answer in "exceptional" or "unusual" cases, such leave is within the sound discretion of the court and requires a showing of "special circumstances" or "necessity." The petitioner alleged that Rolando C. Gapud feared for his safety due to his disclosures about the illicit activities of the Marcoses and their associates, making him unable to testify at the trial. However, the Court found that the petitioner failed to present proof of a real threat to Gapud's life or that adequate security could not be provided. The mere allegation of fear, without substantiation, did not constitute the "special circumstances" required to deviate from the general rule that depositions should be taken after the joinder of issues. The Court noted that the petitioner did not allege that Mr. Gapud was old, sick, or infirm, which are common grounds for allowing depositions before trial. The petitioner's claim of fear for safety was not sufficiently substantiated to establish the necessity of taking the deposition at that point in time. The Court also pointed out that the petitioner had waited a considerable time without actively pursuing the summoning of all defendants and the filing of their answers, suggesting that the deposition could be taken as a matter of course after the issues were joined.
Main Doctrine
A motion for leave to take the deposition of a witness pending action, before the joinder of issues, requires a showing of special circumstances or necessity, and mere allegations of fear for safety without proof of a real threat do not constitute such special circumstances.