Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), created by Administrative Order No. 13 and expanded by Memorandum No. 61, investigated behest loans. A Technical Working Group (TWG) examined loan accounts, including that of Apparel World, Inc. (Apparel). Apparel applied for an Import Letter of Credit with Philippine National Bank (PNB) for DM15,000,000.00 on April 8, 1974. PNB approved the loan on May 5, 1974, with minimal collateral and joint and solidary agreement. As of May 15, 1986, Apparel's unpaid loan had a deficiency of P170,967,849.58. The Committee classified Apparel's account as a BEHEST LOAN. Procedural History: On January 26, 1998, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Francisco Teodoro, Leticia Teodoro, Jose Tabora, and Panfilo O. Domingo. On April 14, 1998, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, prescription, and because Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 were considered ex post facto laws. The Petition: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, represented by Orlando S. Salvador, filed a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Ombudsman's resolution dismissing the complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. Whether the charges for violation of R.A. No. 3019 have prescribed. Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 constitute ex post facto laws.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The resolution of the Ombudsman in Case No. OMB-0-98-0176, dated August 14, 1998, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Ombudsman's discretion: The Supreme Court held that it cannot interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, as this is inherent in the office which acts as the champion of the people. The Court reiterated that it will not review the Ombudsman's discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman's resolution was found to be based on substantial evidence, detailing reasons for dismissing the charges, including the lack of sufficient collateral and capital for the loan, and the absence of proof that Francisco Teodoro was an associate or crony of President Marcos. The foreclosure of the mortgage while President Marcos was still in power was also considered. On prescription of offenses: The Court ruled that the prescription of offenses under R.A. No. 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 states that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. The Court agreed with the Committee that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offense, especially when public officials allegedly connived with beneficiaries, making the violations not reasonably knowable at the time of commission. The Court found the Ombudsman's assertion that 'if the same be not known' means 'not reasonably knowable' to be unacceptable as it defeats the clear intent of the law. Therefore, prescription had not yet set in, contrary to the Ombudsman's finding. On ex post facto laws: The Ombudsman considered Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, issued in 1992, as ex post facto laws because they classified loans as 'behest' or 'non-behest' with corresponding sanctions, when no such classification existed in 1974 when the loan was approved. The Court, however, did not directly rule on whether these issuances were ex post facto laws in its final disposition, focusing instead on the Ombudsman's findings regarding the merits of the case and the prescription issue. The Ombudsman's reasoning that the loan was approved in 1974 without a law classifying it as a behest loan, and that the issuances in 1992 had the effect of an ex post facto law, was part of the basis for dismissal, but the Supreme Court's affirmation was primarily based on the lack of grave abuse of discretion and the substantial evidence supporting the Ombudsman's findings on other grounds.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman's dismissal of charges for violation of R.A. 3019, finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion as the resolution was based on substantial evidence, particularly concerning the prescription of offenses and the lack of proof of manifest partiality or evident bad faith.