Gumabon v. Larin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners executed a Deed of Sale With Right to Repurchase over a parcel of land in Pampanga in favor of respondent. Thirty-nine years later, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City seeking the return of the certificate of title, alleging full payment of the loan. Respondent, in his answer, asserted the transaction was a true sale with a right to repurchase and that the repurchase period had prescribed. Procedural History: The RTC of Quezon City initially dismissed respondent's counterclaim for lack of a certification of non-forum shopping. Subsequently, due to respondent's failure to submit a pre-trial brief and attend pre-trial, petitioners presented evidence ex parte. Respondent filed a demurrer to the evidence, which the RTC denied. Respondent then moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the presiding judge, who voluntarily inhibited herself. The case was raffled to another branch, where the new presiding judge, motu proprio, dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue, stating that the case, being a real action, should have been filed in Pampanga, not Quezon City. The Petition: Petitioners questioned the RTC's order of dismissal for improper venue, arguing that respondent never assailed the venue until the final stages of the proceedings and had implicitly affirmed it by seeking affirmative reliefs.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court can motu proprio dismiss an action for improper venue. Whether the respondent waived his right to object to the venue of the action.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-97-31709 is ordered REINSTATED and remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of motu proprio dismissal for improper venue: The Court ruled in the negative. Improper venue is a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. Unlike jurisdiction, which can be raised at any stage, venue is a rule of procedure that looks to the convenience of the litigants and can be waived. The Supreme Court reiterated that motu proprio dismissals are traditionally limited to instances where the court clearly lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, or when the plaintiff fails to appear, prosecute the action, or comply with court orders. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, while expanding grounds for motu proprio dismissal to include lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pending actions, or bar by prior judgment or statute of limitations, do not include improper venue. Therefore, a motu proprio dismissal on the ground of improper venue is not allowed under the current rules. On the issue of waiver of objection to venue: The Court held that the respondent waived his right to object to the venue. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 16 of the same rules allows improper venue to be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer, with a preliminary hearing at the court's discretion. Respondent failed to raise the issue of improper venue in a motion to dismiss or in his answer. Instead, he actively participated in the proceedings by filing an answer with counterclaim, seeking affirmative reliefs, and filing a demurrer to the evidence. This conduct, coupled with his failure to seasonably object, constitutes an implied assent to the venue of the action, thereby waiving his right to question it later. The Court emphasized that venue is waivable, and failure to object seasonably leads to such waiver, as established in cases like Langkaan Realty Development Inc. vs. UCPB.
Main Doctrine
A trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of improper venue, as this is a waivable procedural defect that must be raised by the defendant either in a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in the answer. Failure to do so, coupled with seeking affirmative reliefs from the court, constitutes a waiver of the objection to venue.