Soriano v. Del Rosario
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioners, Telesforo Soriano and Leon M. Santos, were granted a certificate of public convenience to operate a passenger bus service from San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to Manila, with two branches through the Provinces of Pampanga and Bulacan. This franchise allowed them to pick up and disembark local passengers on specific segments of their routes. 2. Procedural History: After the petitioners commenced operations, the respondent, Rural Transit Co., a prior operator on some of the same lines, filed a motion seeking to revise the terms of the franchise. This motion was initially heard by Assistant Public Service Commissioner R. A. Cruz, who indicated a decision but did not issue a formal order. The case was subsequently transferred to Associate Public Service Commissioner M. V. del Rosario, who, without further hearing, issued a resolution on June 16, 1931, modifying the petitioners' certificate to prohibit them from picking up and disembarking local passengers on certain segments. A motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed an application for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the resolution of June 16, 1931. They argued that the Public Service Commission lacked jurisdiction to modify the original order, which they contended had become final. Alternatively, they argued that even if modification was permissible, the order was issued without affording them a proper hearing, constituting an irregular exercise of judicial power.
Issue(s)
Whether the Public Service Commission has the authority to modify a previously issued certificate of public convenience. Whether the resolution of June 16, 1931, modifying the petitioners' certificate was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, specifically concerning the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard.
Ruling
The application for a writ of certiorari is granted. The resolution of June 16, 1931, is abrogated, and the respondent commissioner is directed to set the motion for further hearing.
Ratio Decidendi
On the authority of the Public Service Commission to modify certificates: The Court held that the Public Service Commission possesses the authority to modify previously issued certificates of public convenience. This authority is explicitly granted by Section 28 of Act No. 3108, which allows the commission to "at any time" order a rehearing to extend, revoke, or modify any order made by it. Furthermore, Section 6 of Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission itself reserves the right to cancel or modify any certificate of public convenience, either on its own initiative or at the request of an interested party, provided proper proceedings are followed. Therefore, the contention that the original order of June 4, 1928, had become final and unalterable was found to be without merit. The commission's jurisdiction to entertain the motion for amendment was thus affirmed. On the irregular exercise of judicial power due to lack of due process: The Court found the contention that the order complained of was issued without affording the petitioners an opportunity to be heard to be well-founded. The hearing contemplated by law requires that a litigant be heard before the judge who decides the case. In this instance, the motion was heard by Commissioner Cruz, who had indicated his intended ruling. It was improper for Commissioner del Rosario to subsequently decide the motion differently without giving the interested parties another opportunity to be heard. While not an absolute want of jurisdiction, this constituted an irregular exercise of judicial power, in excess of lawful jurisdiction, which is a proper basis for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Court cited Leung Ben vs. O'Brien to support this principle.
Main Doctrine
A resolution issued by a Public Service Commissioner modifying a previously granted certificate of public convenience, without affording the certificate holder an opportunity to be heard, constitutes an irregular exercise of judicial power, justifying the issuance of a writ of certiorari.