Elviña v. Filamor
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Maria Elviña filed an application for the registration of lots Nos. 1 and 2. This land had been previously litigated by Elviña and respondent Potenciana C. Domingo in civil case No. 3265 and registration proceeding No. 1644, both decided in favor of Domingo. Another registration proceeding, No. 1934, involving the same land, was pending with Domingo as applicant and Elviña as opponent. Procedural History: On March 16, 1931, after due publication and with no opposition filed, the court declared Domingo in default and rendered a decision adjudicating the lots to Elviña. On April 23, 1931, Domingo filed a motion to set aside the decision, alleging lack of notice. This motion was denied on June 23, 1931, and an order for the issuance of the decree of registration was issued. Domingo moved for reconsideration, which was denied on July 15, 1931. On July 16 and 23, 1931, Domingo filed another amended motion, reiterating her claims and adding that she was the owner of the land, had been in possession for over twenty-five years, and that the land was the subject of prior litigation where she prevailed. On July 29, 1931, the respondent judge granted this amended motion and set aside the default order of March 16, 1931. The Petition: Elviña filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to set aside the orders of July 29, June 23, and July 15, 1931, arguing that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in vacating the decision of March 16, 1931.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in issuing the order of July 29, 1931, which set aside the decision of March 16, 1931, and ordered the reopening of the case.
Ruling
The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge acted with jurisdiction in setting aside the order of default and the decision of March 16, 1931. Although the decision had become final because Potenciana C. Domingo did not appeal from it, she was still entitled to ask for relief from it. This relief was based on grounds of fraud, surprise, or excusable negligence in procuring the decision, provided such relief was requested within a reasonable time, not exceeding six months from the date of the decision, as provided by Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Potenciana C. Domingo's motions to set aside the decision were filed within this six-month period, specifically on April 23, 1931, and later amended motions on July 16 and 23, 1931, all well within the six months from the March 16, 1931 decision. Crucially, the final decree of confirmation and registration, although ordered on June 23, 1931, had not yet been issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office when the motions were filed and the July 29, 1931 order was entered. Therefore, Section 38 of Act No. 496, which limits review to one year after the issuance of the decree on grounds of fraud, was not yet applicable. Given that the six-month period under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not elapsed and the decree of registration had not been issued, the respondent judge possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the motions and issue the order setting aside the default and reopening the case, consistent with previous jurisprudence.
Main Doctrine
An order of default and the decision wherein said order is included, entered in a registration proceeding, may be set aside even after thirty days from its promulgation, by reason of fraud, surprise, or excusable negligence, if a motion is filed to that effect within six months from the date of the decision, under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and before the chief of the General Land Registration Office issues the decree of registration in pursuance of the order to that end.