People v. Nabong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The appellant, Ignacio Nabong, an attorney, was retained to defend Juan Feleo, a communist leader. A necrological service for Antonio D. Ora, head of the communists, was scheduled, and the red flag was to be displayed. Major Silvino Gallardo, head of the Philippine Constabulary in Cabanatuan, consulted the provincial fiscal, who opined that the display of the red flag was unlawful. Major Gallardo requested Nabong to prevent the display of the red flag. Nabong, after reading the fiscal's opinion, disagreed and stated he would advise the communists to display the flag, warning that prohibiting it might cause a disturbance. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija found the appellant, Ignacio Nabong, guilty of sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692, and sentenced him to pay a fine of two hundred pesos with subsidiary imprisonment. The appellant appealed this judgment. The Petition: The appellant appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance, arguing, among other things, that the provisions on sedition are incompatible with the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the Jones Law.
Issue(s)
Whether the language used by the appellant constituted sedition. Whether the provisions on sedition are incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, with modification to include imprisonment for six months in addition to the fine. The Court held that the language used by the appellant constituted sedition and that such utterances are not protected by the freedom of speech and of the press.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the language used by the appellant constituted sedition: The Court found that the language used by the appellant, including phrases like "Overthrow the present government and establish our own government, the government of the poor" and "Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides," clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence. The Court interpreted "overthrow" not as an ordinary change through the elective franchise, but as an unlawful means. The reference to using a whip was inconsistent with a mild interpretation and indicated a purpose to incite hearers to overthrow organized government by unlawful means. The words tended to induce resistance against agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to unlawful meetings and rebellious conspiracies, thereby disturbing public peace and order. The Court emphasized that actual disturbance is not necessary; utterances that endanger public order are sufficient. On Whether the provisions on sedition are incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press: The Court held that the provisions of law relating to sedition are not incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press. The Court clarified that the acts contemplated in sedition laws are abuses rather than the exercise of the right of speech and press. It is a fundamental principle that freedom of speech and press does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility, nor does it grant unrestricted license that provides immunity for every possible use of language. The Court cited Gitlow vs. New York to support the principle that such utterances involve danger to public peace and state security, threatening breaches of peace and ultimate revolution, and the immediate danger is real and substantial even if the effect cannot be accurately foreseen.
Main Doctrine
Utterances that incite the people to resist and use violence against agents of the government, and to overthrow organized government by unlawful means, are seditious and not protected by the freedom of speech and of the press, as they constitute abuses rather than the exercise of these rights.