Allarde v. Abaya
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a dispute over the inheritance of property originally belonging to the spouses Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido. Their children were Adriano Abaya and Cornelia Abaya. Adriano Abaya died single, leaving a daughter, Inocencia Abaya, who claims to be his acknowledged natural child. Cornelia Abaya married Dionisio Abaya and had several children, including the defendants. The plaintiffs, children of Guillermo Abaya (another child of Cornelia and Dionisio), and Inocencia Abaya, seek to partition the property they allege was left by Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido. Procedural History: The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur seeking partition of the real property. The defendants denied the plaintiffs' claims, asserting sole ownership through their predecessors, Dionisio Abaya and Cornelia Abaya, who had allegedly possessed the property for over fifty years. The trial court ruled that Inocencia Abaya had no right to the property as she was neither a legitimate nor a natural child of Adriano Abaya, and even if she were, her action had prescribed. The court also found that the property belonging to Bibiano Abaya had not been identified and that some parcels belonged to Dionisio Abaya. Ultimately, the court decreed that the property belonged in common to the plaintiffs (children of Guillermo Abaya) and the defendants, ordering a partition. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. The Petition: The plaintiffs, specifically Inocencia Abaya and the children of Guillermo Abaya, appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance. Their appeal raised numerous errors, including the court's findings on Inocencia Abaya's filiation, the identification of the disputed lands, the ownership of certain parcels, and the prescription of Inocencia Abaya's action. The core of their argument is that Inocencia Abaya is an acknowledged natural child of Adriano Abaya and thus has a right to inherit from her natural grandparents, Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido, and that her claim had not prescribed. They sought a reversal of the lower court's judgment and a declaration of their rights to the inherited property.
Issue(s)
Whether the court a quo erred in holding that it has not been proved that Adriano Abaya acknowledged Inocencia Abaya as his daughter, and in determining the requisites for such acknowledgment. Whether Inocencia Abaya, as an acknowledged natural daughter of Adriano Abaya, is entitled to share in the estate of her natural grandparents, Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido. Whether the right of action of Inocencia Abaya to ask for the partition of the estate left by her natural father, Adriano Abaya, and which was inherited from the latter's legitimate father, Bibiano Abaya, has prescribed. Whether the property belonging to Bibiano Abaya has been sufficiently identified to proceed with partition.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed. The Supreme Court held that Inocencia Abaya is the acknowledged natural child of Adriano Abaya, with the right to one-sixth of Adriano's share in the estate of Bibiano Abaya. The case is remanded for identification of the property left by Bibiano Abaya and inherited by Adriano Abaya.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court found that the court a quo erred in its holding. To be considered a natural child under Law 11 of the Laws of Toro, two requisites must be met: first, the father must have had the capacity to contract marriage without dispensation at the time of the child's birth or conception, and second, the father must acknowledge the child as his own. The defendants admitted Adriano Abaya was Inocencia's father and died single, satisfying the first requisite for the father. Regarding the mother's capacity to marry, the Court, citing decisions from the Supreme Court of Spain, held that once the father's filiation and capacity are established, the law presumes the parents were qualified for marriage unless proven otherwise, meaning there is no need to prove the mother's capacity. As for acknowledgment, the Court reiterated the doctrine that it need not be express but can be tacit, proven by any legal means. The defendants' consistent acknowledgment of Inocencia as Adriano's daughter, along with evidence that Adriano himself arranged for Inocencia to be brought from Manila after his appointment as Promotor Fiscal, constituted sufficient proof of acknowledgment. The Court also noted that hearsay evidence, if not objected to, becomes admissible by tacit consent, which applied to Victor Allarde's testimony regarding Adriano's letter. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court held that Inocencia Abaya, as an acknowledged natural daughter of Adriano Abaya, is not entitled to inherit from her natural grandparents, Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido, by representation. The Court explained that upon Bibiano Abaya's death around 1861 (before the Civil Code), Adriano Abaya inherited one-half of his estate. Adriano Abaya died on July 19, 1889, also before the Civil Code took effect, meaning Inocencia's rights to his hereditary estate were governed by former legislation (laws 8 and 9, title 13, partida 6), which allowed natural children to receive one-sixth of their natural father's estate if there were no legitimate descendants or ascendants. However, citing the case of Centeno vs. Centeno (52 Phil., 322), the Court explicitly stated that acknowledged natural children, whether born before or after the Civil Code, do not have the right to represent their natural father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather, as they are not called by law to participate in their grandparent's estate. Therefore, Inocencia could only inherit from her father Adriano's share derived from Bibiano, but not directly from Juliana Rebullido's estate by representation. On Issue 3: The Supreme Court ruled that Inocencia Abaya's right of action for partition had not prescribed. The defendants admitted that Inocencia received annual shares of palay and sugar from Dionisio Abaya until his death in 1927. While the defendants claimed these were given out of charity, the Court highlighted that the defendants themselves (Maria, Francisco, Valentin, and Francisca Abaya) admitted in a deed (Exhibit C) that Inocencia Abaya was entitled to participate in certain real property left by Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido. This acknowledgment by the defendants and their predecessor in interest, Dionisio Abaya, negated any claim of adverse possession. The Court clarified that if a right is acknowledged, the possession of the property is not adverse and thus fails to satisfy one of the essential requisites for prescription under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the action for partition, stemming from an acknowledged co-ownership, was not barred by prescription. On Issue 4: The Supreme Court noted that while the plaintiffs-appellants attempted to prove that the lands in litigation were conjugal property of Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido, they were not permitted to physically identify them in the presence of arbiters by the trial court. Due to this procedural error, the record lacked clear data distinguishing which lands belonged to the deceased spouses and what specific portion corresponded to Adriano Abaya, in which Inocencia Abaya was entitled to participate. Therefore, the Court found it necessary to remand the case to the court of origin to allow Inocencia Abaya to properly identify the specific property left by Bibiano Abaya and inherited by Adriano Abaya, to ensure a proper partition according to her adjudicated share.
Main Doctrine
An acknowledged natural child, born before the Civil Code, whose father died before the Civil Code, is entitled to one-sixth of the father's share in the estate of the natural grandfather, but has no right to inherit by representation from the natural grandmother.