People v. Sensano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married in 1919 and had one child. Ventura abandoned his wife and child for three years without support. During his absence, Sensano lived with Marcelo Ramos. Ventura filed a charge for adultery against them in 1924, resulting in a sentence for both. After serving her sentence, Sensano sought reconciliation with Ventura, who refused and told her she could do as she pleased. Sensano then returned to live with Ramos in 1924, and they have lived together since. Ventura, knowing this, did nothing to interfere and left for Hawaii for seven years. Upon his return, he filed a second adultery charge against Sensano and Ramos, stating his purpose was to obtain a divorce. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sentenced the appellants for adultery. The Petition: The appellants appealed the decision, arguing that the offended husband had consented to the adultery by his actions and prolonged silence.
Issue(s)
Whether the offended husband consented to the adulterous relations between the accused, thereby barring prosecution for adultery. Whether the husband's prolonged absence and inaction constitute consent or pardon under the law.
Ruling
The judgment below is reversed. The Court found that the evidence and the husband's conduct warranted the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations, thus he is not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceeding.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the offended husband consented to the adulterous relations between the accused, thereby barring prosecution for adultery: The Court held that the offended spouse cannot institute criminal prosecution for adultery if they have consented to or pardoned the offenders, as provided by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence presented, particularly the husband's conduct after his wife's first sentence and his subsequent seven-year absence and inaction despite knowledge of her cohabitation with Ramos, strongly indicated consent. His stated purpose of seeking a divorce further supported the inference that he was not genuinely an "offended" spouse seeking justice but rather pursuing a personal objective. On Whether the husband's prolonged absence and inaction constitute consent or pardon under the law: The Court rejected the argument that the husband's absence from the Philippine Islands made it impossible for him to take action. It found no merit in this contention, emphasizing that seven years of acquiescence, coupled with his explicit refusal to reconcile and his statement allowing his wife to do as she pleased, constituted consent. This prolonged period of inaction, despite knowledge of the ongoing adulterous relationship, demonstrated a waiver of his right to prosecute. The law requires the offended spouse to act diligently, and prolonged silence and inaction, especially after an explicit statement of indifference, can be interpreted as consent.
Main Doctrine
The offended spouse cannot institute criminal proceedings for adultery if they have consented to or pardoned the offenders. Consent can be inferred from prolonged inaction and acquiescence to the adulterous relationship.