People v. Lapitan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Luis Lapitan, Gaudencio Lapitan, and Dalmacio Lapitan were charged with assault upon an agent of a person in authority. An order of execution was issued for 60 cavans of palay. Luis Lapitan filed a third-party claim. Due to the judgment creditor's delay in furnishing an indemnity bond, the provincial sheriff directed the chief of police of Rizal, who was a deputy sheriff ex officio, to deliver the palay to Luis Lapitan. Subsequently, the provincial sheriff directed the chief of police to retake possession of the palay after the indemnity bond was furnished. The chief of police ordered Juan Sambrano, a municipal policeman, to take possession of the palay. On January 29, 1932, Sambrano was watching the palay when the defendants arrived with carts to take it. When Sambrano asserted they had no right to take the palay without a court order, Dalmacio Lapitan struck him with his fist, and Luis Lapitan threatened him with a gun. The defendants then pushed Sambrano aside and removed the palay. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija found Luis Lapitan and Dalmacio Lapitan guilty of violating Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing each to two months and one day of arresto mayor, a fine of P150, with subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. Gaudencio Lapitan was acquitted. The Petition: The appellants, Luis Lapitan and Dalmacio Lapitan, appealed the decision, assigning errors related to the trial court's failure to give credit to their declarations, its finding of guilt under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code, and its failure to acquit them.
Issue(s)
Whether Juan Sambrano, a municipal policeman acting as deputy sheriff ex officio, was lawfully discharging his official duties when assaulted. Whether the chief of police, as a deputy sheriff ex officio, could delegate the seizure of palay to a policeman under his command. Whether the acts of the appellants constitute a violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, finding the appellants guilty of assault upon an agent of a person in authority under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Juan Sambrano was lawfully discharging his official duties: The Court held that Juan Sambrano was lawfully discharging his official duties. The order of execution was still valid when the provincial sheriff directed the chief of police of Rizal, as deputy sheriff ex officio, to seize the palay again. The chief of police, in turn, ordered the municipal policeman, Juan Sambrano, to take possession of the palay. Therefore, Sambrano was acting under lawful authority when he attempted to prevent the removal of the palay. On the delegation of seizure duties by the chief of police: The Court ruled that the chief of police, as a deputy sheriff ex officio, could delegate the seizure of the palay to a policeman. While acknowledging the argument that the chief of police should personally levy upon the palay, the Court found it unlikely that the Legislature intended for the chief of police to personally perform all such duties, as this could interfere with their primary responsibilities as head of the police force. The Court reasoned that the chief of police, being a deputy sheriff by virtue of his office, could utilize the members of the police force to carry out such duties. On the violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code: The Court found that the acts of the appellants constituted a violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence showed that Dalmacio Lapitan struck the policeman with his fist, and Luis Lapitan threatened him with a gun while the policeman was performing his duty of guarding the palay under lawful orders. The Court rejected the Solicitor-General's argument for a conviction under Article 148, finding that Article 151 was the appropriate charge, and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Main Doctrine
A municipal policeman acting as a deputy sheriff ex officio may delegate the seizure of property under a writ of execution to other members of the police force, as the legislative intent was not to require the chief of police to personally perform all such duties, which could interfere with their primary responsibilities.