Arteche v. De la Rosa
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Pedro R. Arteche was elected provincial governor of Samar, but his election was declared null and void by the respondent judge. Despite this, petitioner assumed office on October 16, 1931, acting on the opinion of the Chief of the Executive Bureau and the Secretary of Justice, while his election case was pending appeal. Procedural History: On September 20, 1932, Jose Quisumbing, provincial fiscal of Samar, charged petitioner with violation of the Election Law for taking possession of the office of provincial governor knowing he was disqualified. The respondent judge issued an arrest order. Petitioner waived preliminary investigation and sought a subpoena duces tecum for the respondent judge to produce communications regarding his oath-taking. Petitioner also filed a motion for inhibition and disqualification of the respondent judge, alleging he was a principal witness for the defense. Both motions were denied. The Petition: On July 3, 1933, the provincial fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the case, stating he could not prove petitioner assumed office knowing he was disqualified. The respondent judge denied this motion. Petitioner then filed an application for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction, seeking to halt proceedings, vacate the order denying dismissal, and disqualify the respondent judge, or have another judge assigned to the case.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the criminal case. Whether the respondent judge should be disqualified from hearing the case. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The preliminary injunction is set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the motion to dismiss: The denial of the fiscal's motion for dismissal was a judicial act within the discretion of the respondent judge. Mandamus will not lie to control or review the exercise of discretion of a court when the act complained of is judicial or quasi-judicial. Mandamus may compel a judge to decide a question, but not to decide it in a particular way. The respondent judge's denial of the motion was a valid exercise of his discretion. On the disqualification of the respondent judge: The petitioner had no valid reason for calling the respondent judge as a witness, as this appeared to be an indirect method to prevent the judge from trying the case. There was also no valid reason for objecting to the judge's competency, as he was not disqualified under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The law provides that when a judge claims to be disqualified, he shall proceed with the trial or withdraw based on his determination, and his decision in favor of his own competency is not subject to appeal or stay of action until after final judgment. On the entitlement to writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus: The petitioner's claim of not being given a fair, impartial, and just hearing, and the anticipation of a conviction, were without justification and premature. If the petitioner is deprived of a fair trial or is erroneously convicted, he has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the right to appeal to the Supreme Court after final judgment. Therefore, the extraordinary writs sought are not warranted.
Main Doctrine
A writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus will not lie to control or review the exercise of judicial discretion when the act complained of is judicial or quasi-judicial. Furthermore, a judge is not disqualified from trying a case merely because the accused seeks to call him as a witness, especially when such attempt appears to be an indirect method to prevent the judge from trying the case. If a party is deprived of a fair and impartial trial or is erroneously convicted, the proper remedy is to appeal after final judgment.