Cu Unjieng v. Goddard
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioner, Mariano Cu Unjieng, is on trial in the Court of First Instance of Manila for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. During his cross-examination, the petitioner was asked about brokers charging commissions for securing loans. The presiding judge, Leonard S. Goddard, then dictated a letter to the city fiscal, naming specific brokers (Isaac Barza, Juan Molina, Eduardo Alcantara) and suggesting an investigation into their alleged practice of charging as much as 5% for securing loans. 2. Procedural History: Following the judge's dictation of the letter to the fiscal, the petitioner filed a motion requesting that this letter be included in the official transcript of the trial proceedings. The respondent judge denied this motion, stating the letter was not part of the case proceedings and its inclusion was not mandated by law. Subsequently, during the same trial, the petitioner's counsel protested the expungement of certain answers from the record, arguing it violated Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judge also issued general orders to stenographers not to record arguments of counsel. The petitioner initiated this original action seeking writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks relief through certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. His first cause of action argues that the refusal to include the judge's letter to the fiscal in the transcript violates Act No. 4011, but the Court finds this matter appealable upon conviction. The second cause of action, concerning the expungement of specific testimony, is divided into two parts: A, where the Court finds the expunged statement was not a responsive answer and thus not covered by the mandatory recording provision, and B, where the Court finds the expunged statements were responsive answers and orders a writ of mandamus to compel their inclusion in the transcript. The third cause of action, regarding general orders to stenographers not to record arguments of counsel, is denied due to the petitioner's tardiness and the ongoing nature of the trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial judge's letter to the City Fiscal constitutes a statement that must be recorded in the stenographic notes under Act No. 4011. Whether Section 32 of General Orders, No. 58 requires the inclusion of non-responsive or volunteered statements by a witness in the trial record. Whether responsive answers to questions asked by counsel may be expunged from the record upon counsel's claim of misapprehension. Whether the court may prohibit the trial judge from ordering stenographers not to record arguments of counsel.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition in part. It granted the writ of mandamus regarding the second cause of action, paragraph B, ordering the restoration of the expunged question and answer. In all other respects, the petition was denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that mandamus does not lie because the petitioner has an adequate remedy via appeal. Every material fact regarding the letter and the judge's refusal to include it was preserved in the petitioner's motion and the court's subsequent order dated August 17, 1933. Since these documents are already part of the record of the case, the petitioner can present the identical question upon appeal in the event of a conviction. Therefore, there is no necessity for an extraordinary writ to compel the inclusion of the letter in the stenographic notes at this stage. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that Section 32 of General Orders, No. 58, while mandatory, only applies to 'answers' that are responsive to the questions put to the witness. Statements that are volunteered by a witness and are not within the reasonable intendment of the question propounded do not fall within the mandatory requirement. The Court reasoned that if non-responsive statements were mandatory, a designing witness could clutter the record with scandalous or lengthy irrelevant matter, depriving the opposing side of the opportunity to object. Consequently, the trial judge did not err in expunging the non-responsive portion of the petitioner's testimony regarding Warner, Barnes & Co. On Issue 3: The Court held that the trial judge committed a reversible error in expunging the questions and answers regarding the checks (Incident 2B). Unlike Incident 2A, the answers here were responsive to the questions asked. Section 32 of General Orders, No. 58 makes no provision for the obliteration of responsive answers based on a counsel's assertion of 'misapprehension.' The Court emphasized that in the absence of a jury, a full and accurate record is essential for appellate review. Because the answers were responsive, they must be transcribed regardless of their perceived lack of benefit to the accused or the prosecution's mistake. On Issue 4: The Court denied the prayer for a writ of prohibition regarding the recording of arguments. The Court noted that the trial had proceeded almost continuously for two years, generating 21,000 pages of transcript and over 40,000 exhibits. The petitioner and his counsel had seemingly acquiesced to the judge's orders throughout the lengthy trial. Given that the trial was approaching its conclusion, the petitioner was deemed 'tardy' in seeking relief for this general allegation, and no specific instances of prejudice were provided to justify the issuance of the writ.
Main Doctrine
A writ of certiorari does not lie if an adequate review by appeal is available. Expungement of non-responsive volunteered statements from the record is permissible, but responsive answers, even if deemed irrelevant by the trial court, must be transcribed as part of the record under Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.