Pascua v. Ocampo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originates from a civil dispute where Gregorio Pascua and others (petitioners) were plaintiffs, and Hilaria Aguilar and others were defendants. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered an adverse judgment against the plaintiffs on April 29, 1933. 2. Procedural History: The plaintiffs, having received notice of the adverse judgment on May 8, 1933, filed a motion for reconsideration on May 26, 1933, which was denied on July 13, 1933. Subsequently, on July 20, 1933, seventy-three days after initial notice, they filed a motion for a new trial. This motion was denied on July 22, 1933. The plaintiffs then filed their exception and notice of appeal on July 29, 1933, followed by their bill of exceptions on August 5, 1933. The respondent court rejected the bill of exceptions on September 21, 1933, deeming the motion for a new trial untimely filed. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed an original petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking to compel the respondent Judge of First Instance to approve and certify their bill of exceptions. They argue that the respondent court erred in rejecting the bill of exceptions, contending that their motions, particularly the motion for a new trial, were timely filed and should have suspended the period for appeal. The core of their argument hinges on the interpretation of the thirty-day period for filing motions for new trial as prescribed by Section 145 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2347.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners suspended the running of the period for filing a bill of exceptions. Whether the motion for a new trial was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. The respondent court correctly rejected the bill of exceptions.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration suspended the period: The Court held that a motion for reconsideration, to be considered a motion for a new trial that suspends the reglementary period, must comply with the requisites prescribed by law, specifically section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The motion filed by the petitioners on May 26, 1933, was not based on any of the grounds enumerated in section 145, nor did it pray for the annulment of the judgment and the holding of a new trial. Therefore, it was not a motion for a new trial in the legal sense and did not suspend the running of the thirty-day period. On the issue of whether the motion for a new trial was filed within the reglementary period: The Court found that the actual motion for a new trial, which complied with the formalities of the law, was filed on July 20, 1933, seventy-three days after the petitioners received notice of the decision. This was well beyond the thirty-day period fixed by law. The earlier motion for reconsideration did not suspend this period because it was not a legally recognized motion for a new trial. Consequently, the subsequent filing of the bill of exceptions was untimely.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration, which is not based upon any of the grounds enumerated in section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2347, and wherein the annulment of the judgment and the holding of a new trial are not prayed for, is not a motion for a new trial within the meaning of the law, and the filing thereof does not suspend the running of the period of thirty days stated in the section aforecited.