Domalsin v. Valenciano
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the possession of a parcel of land located at sitio Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. Petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin claims to have been the lawful owner and possessor of this land since 1979, having declared it for taxation, introduced improvements, and paid taxes. In August 1998, respondents Spouses Juanito and Amalia Valenciano allegedly entered the premises and began constructing a cement building without Domalsin's consent, by means of force and strategy, prompting Domalsin to file a complaint for forcible entry. 2. Procedural History: Domalsin filed a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for injunction before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tuba-Sablan. The MCTC ruled in favor of Domalsin, declaring him the actual possessor and ordering the Valencianos to vacate. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MCTC's decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's ruling, finding that the issue of abandonment was immaterial and that the property in dispute was a portion of the Kennon Road right-of-way, which is part of public dominion and not susceptible to private acquisition or ownership. The Court of Appeals ordered the Valencianos to remove their structure and vacate the premises, delivering possession to the Department of Public Works and Highways. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the appellate court erred in holding that he abandoned the property and in reversing the decisions of the lower courts. He contends that his prior possession should have been respected, and that the Court of Appeals improperly declared the issue of abandonment immaterial. The petition raises two main assignments of error concerning the alleged abandonment and the reversal of the lower courts' rulings.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decisions of the lower courts which favored the petitioner in a forcible entry case. Whether the petitioner abandoned the disputed property. Whether the subject property, being a road-right-of-way, can be the subject of a forcible entry case between private parties.
Ruling
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. It set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The Court ordered respondents Juanito and Amalia Valenciano to remove their structure and vacate the subject land within sixty (60) days from receipt of the decision, and to deliver physical possession thereof to the Office of the District Engineer, Benguet Engineering District, Department of Public Works and Highways.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decisions of the lower courts: The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in prioritizing the respondents' actual possession over the petitioner's prior possession, especially since the property in question is a road-right-of-way and thus part of public dominion. The Court reiterated that in ejectment cases, the determination of who is entitled to physical possession is based on prior possession, not ownership. The Court emphasized that regardless of the title to the property, the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by force, and unlawful withholding is not allowed. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have based its decision on who had prior physical possession, as the main thing to be proven in a forcible entry action is prior possession lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, requiring restoration of possession regardless of title or ownership. On the issue of abandonment: The Supreme Court found that the petitioner did not abandon the subject land. The Court reasoned that petitioner's opposition to the respondents' construction and the subsequent filing of the forcible entry case were clear indicia of non-abandonment. The destruction of the house by an earthquake and its subsequent leveling by Gloria Banuca did not signify abandonment, as abandonment requires the voluntary renunciation of all rights with the intent to lose the thing, which was not evident here. The Court noted that the hope of recovery (spes recuperandi) was not gone and the intention of returning (animus revertendi) was not given up. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in deeming the issue of abandonment immaterial. On the issue of whether the subject property, being a road-right-of-way, can be the subject of a forcible entry case between private parties: The Supreme Court held that the subject property, being a portion of the road-right-of-way of Kennon Road, is part of public dominion and therefore cannot be appropriated by private parties, nor can they claim any right of possession over it. Article 420 of the Civil Code explicitly lists properties of public dominion, including roads intended for public use. Article 530 of the Civil Code states that only things and rights susceptible of appropriation may be the object of possession. Consequently, neither the petitioner nor the respondents could claim ownership or possessory rights over the land. However, the Court clarified that despite this, the issue of prior possession remains relevant in determining who is entitled to immediate possession until the State exercises its right over the property. The Court ultimately ordered the respondents to remove their structure and deliver possession to the DPWH.
Main Doctrine
In ejectment proceedings, particularly forcible entry, the paramount issue is prior physical possession (possession de facto), not ownership. A party who can prove prior possession can recover possession even against the owner, as the law respects prior possession. The Court clarified that even when the property in dispute is part of public dominion and thus cannot be appropriated by private individuals, the principle of respecting prior possession still applies in determining who is entitled to immediate possession. Abandonment, which is the voluntary renunciation of all rights with the intent to lose the thing, must be clearly established and is not presumed merely from the destruction of a structure by a fortuitous event or from the failure to rebuild, especially when the possessor continues to pay taxes and objects to subsequent intrusions.