David v. Arroyo
CLARIFICATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Citing a conspiracy between the political opposition, the extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA), and the extreme Right (military adventurists) to overthrow the government, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) on February 24, 2006, declaring a state of national emergency. On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence. Procedural History: Following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, several events transpired: permits for rallies celebrating the EDSA People Power I anniversary were revoked; protesters, including petitioners Randolf David and members of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), were violently dispersed and arrested without warrants; the offices of the Daily Tribune newspaper were raided by the police without a warrant, and materials were confiscated; and government officials issued warnings to media outlets. Seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed directly with the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1021, lifting the state of national emergency. The Petition: Petitioners, a diverse group including academics, journalists, members of Congress, and civil society organizations, argued that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were unconstitutional. They contended that the issuances constituted a usurpation of legislative power, violated fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and amounted to a de facto declaration of martial law without fulfilling the constitutional requirements. They also argued that there was no factual basis for the declaration and that the subsequent acts of the police and military were illegal.
Issue(s)
Whether the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the petitions moot and academic. Whether the petitioners have legal standing. Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. Whether PP 1017 is unconstitutional for being an invalid exercise of the President's calling-out power, for granting the President legislative power, and for invalidly invoking the power to take over private businesses. Whether G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. Whether the warrantless arrests, searches, seizures, and dispersal of rallies committed in the implementation of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were unconstitutional.
Ruling
The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring a national emergency under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, but the portion referring to 'acts of terrorism' is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of petitioners, dispersal of rallies, imposition of standards on media, and the warrantless search of the Tribune offices are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ratio Decidendi
On Mootness: The case is not moot. The Court held that despite the lifting of PP 1017, the petitions must be resolved because they involve grave constitutional violations, the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest, the issues require the formulation of controlling principles for the bench and bar, and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The illegal acts allegedly committed during the proclamation's effectivity required a determination of its validity. On Locus Standi: All petitioners have legal standing. The Court applied the 'transcendental importance' doctrine, relaxing the stringent 'direct injury' test. Petitioners David, Llamas, and Cacho-Olivares suffered direct injuries (illegal arrest and search), giving them clear standing. The congressmen had standing to question the alleged usurpation of legislative powers. For other petitioners like civic organizations and IBP officers, the paramount public importance of the constitutional issues justified the relaxation of standing requirements, allowing the Court to address the critical matters raised. On Review of Factual Bases: The Court has the authority to review the factual bases of the President's exercise of the calling-out power. Citing Lansang v. Garcia and IBP v. Zamora, the Court affirmed that under the expanded definition of judicial power in the 1987 Constitution, it can determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion. The standard is not correctness but arbitrariness. In this case, however, petitioners failed to show that the President's decision was 'totally bereft of factual basis,' as the government presented a detailed narration of events (e.g., Magdalo escape, NPA-military alliance) which petitioners did not refute. On Constitutionality of PP 1017: The proclamation is constitutional in part and unconstitutional in others. The call on the AFP to suppress lawless violence is a valid exercise of the President's 'calling-out' power under Article VII, Section 18. However, the clause authorizing the enforcement of 'decrees' is unconstitutional, as the President has no legislative power to issue decrees. Similarly, the invocation of Article XII, Section 17 to justify a potential takeover of private businesses is unconstitutional without prior legislative delegation; the power belongs to the 'State' (i.e., Congress), not the President alone. On Constitutionality of G.O. No. 5: G.O. No. 5 is generally valid as an implementing order for the valid aspect of PP 1017. It provides a valid standard: 'necessary and appropriate actions and measures.' However, the phrase 'acts of terrorism' is unconstitutional because Congress has not yet enacted a law defining and punishing terrorism. This lack of a legal definition makes the term vague and susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, thereby violating the due process clause. On the 'As Applied' Challenge: The specific acts of implementation were unconstitutional. The warrantless arrest of David and Llamas, the dispersal of KMU rallies, the raid on the Daily Tribune, and the warnings to media were all illegal. These acts were not justified by the valid calling-out power in PP 1017. The Court emphasized that freedom of assembly can only be restricted upon a showing of a clear and present danger, and the warrantless search of the Tribune was a blatant violation of freedom of the press and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Main Doctrine
The President's 'calling-out' power under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution is limited to summoning the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. This power does not grant the President legislative authority to issue decrees, nor does it authorize the enforcement of laws unrelated to the suppression of lawless violence. Furthermore, the declaration of a 'state of national emergency' does not, by itself, empower the President to take over private utilities or businesses under Article XII, Section 17, as this requires prior legislative delegation. Any implementation of the calling-out power that results in violations of fundamental rights, such as warrantless arrests, searches, and prior restraint on the press without legal basis, is unconstitutional.