Tel-Equen v. Datumanong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of Mountain Province, DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region, was charged with dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service before the Office of the Ombudsman. These charges stemmed from the anomalous payment of P553,900.00 for bailey bridge components. On March 28, 1994, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found Tel-Equen and others guilty and ordered their dismissal from the service. Procedural History: After motions for reconsideration were denied, petitions were filed before the Supreme Court, which were referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Fabian v. Desierto. On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Ombudsman's decision, dismissing Tel-Equen and two co-accused while exonerating two others. Tel-Equen and his co-accused appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 144694). The Petition: While G.R. No. 144694 was pending, then Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001, dismissing Tel-Equen from the service. The Memorandum Order cited the Ombudsman's December 11, 1995 order and the Court of Appeals' March 2, 2000 decision, stating that the dismissal order was immediately executory as no injunction or restraining order had been issued by the Supreme Court. Tel-Equen filed the present petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court, alleging that the issuance of the Memorandum Order despite the pending appeal constituted a contumacious act, a gross abuse of discretion, and an unlawful interference with the judicial proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong, dismissing petitioner from the service while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, constitutes contempt of court. Whether the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately executory pending appeal.
Ruling
The petition to cite former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong in contempt of court is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court found that the issuance of the Memorandum Order was not a contumacious conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, as it lacked willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice. Furthermore, two supervening events supported the dismissal: the Supreme Court's affirmation of petitioner's dismissal in G.R. No. 144694 on March 28, 2005, and the amendment of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which clarified the executory nature of decisions pending appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: Whether the issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong, dismissing petitioner from the service while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, constitutes contempt of court. The Court held that the issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong did not constitute contempt of court. Contemptuous conduct implies willfulness, bad faith, or a deliberate intent to cause injustice, which was absent in this case. The Secretary issued the order after ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court, and it was issued only after the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. At most, it was considered an error of judgment or a result of confusion regarding the rules on the execution of decisions pending appeal. The power to cite for contempt is inherent in courts and must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindication, but to preserve the dignity of the court and the administration of justice. The petitioner's remedy was to elevate the alleged error to the higher court for review, not to file a contempt charge. On Issue 2: Whether the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately executory pending appeal. The Court clarified that decisions of the Civil Service Commission under the Administrative Code of 1987, and by extension, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, are generally immediately executory even pending appeal, as mandated by pertinent laws. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all provisional orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. While decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary are final and unappealable, other decisions imposing harsher penalties are subject to appeal. However, the Court, referencing Lapid v. Court of Appeals, noted that the principle of "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" applies, meaning that the express mention of certain decisions as final and unappealable excludes others. The Court further explained that a judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law, and the right to appeal generally carries with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal, otherwise, the appealability would be rendered nugatory. However, subsequent amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, specifically Administrative Order No. 17, clarified that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and if the respondent wins on appeal, they shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and paid accordingly. This amendment was deemed procedural and retroactively applicable.
Main Doctrine
A public official cannot be held in contempt of court for issuing an order that may be erroneous or premature, provided there is no showing of malice, bad faith, or a deliberate intent to obstruct justice. The contempt power of courts is reserved for willful disobedience or defiance, not for errors in judgment or misinterpretations of procedural rules, especially when the official acted based on their understanding of the executory nature of a decision pending appeal. Furthermore, the case clarifies that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, unless falling under specific exceptions, are immediately executory, but an appeal timely filed generally stays their execution, a principle that was subject to clarification and amendment.