People v. Lacson
["REVERSAL", "CLARIFICATION"]Facts
The Antecedents: This case concerns the respondent's motions for reconsideration and inhibition following a prior resolution by the Supreme Court. The underlying dispute involves criminal charges previously dismissed by a lower court. The respondent, Panfilo M. Lacson, is seeking to have certain justices recuse themselves from further deliberation on his motions. Procedural History: The Supreme Court had previously issued a resolution on April 29, 2003, denying the respondent's motions. This resolution was a reconsideration of an earlier ruling. The respondent's current motions seek to overturn this April 29, 2003 resolution and also request the inhibition of several Associate Justices who were appointed after the oral arguments and submission of the case. The Court had previously denied similar motions for inhibition. The Petition: The respondent's primary arguments revolve around the application of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically whether it should apply prospectively or retroactively. He contends that the rule, which imposes a time bar for reviving provisionally dismissed cases, should be applied retroactively as it favors the accused and is crucial for ensuring a speedy disposition of cases. The petitioners, conversely, argue for prospective application, asserting that retroactive application would impair vested rights and work injustice. The respondent also argues that his prior motion for judicial determination of probable cause implicitly included a prayer for dismissal, and that his admissions in lower courts should not be considered judicial admissions in this context.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for inhibition against Associate Justices Corona, Austria-Martinez, Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna should be granted. Whether Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively or retroactively. Whether the respondent complied with the essential prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117, namely, giving express consent to the provisional dismissal and providing notice to the offended parties.
Ruling
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacson's Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: No, the motion for inhibition is denied. The Court ruled that the grounds cited by the respondent had already been previously raised and resolved. The Court reiterated that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC, regarding the participation of justices in motions for reconsideration, applies only to cases in the Divisions, not the Court En Banc. For En Banc cases, the established policy is that the replacement of a retired ponente will act upon the motion. Furthermore, the justices were not disqualified from participating simply because they were appointed after the oral arguments, as the transcripts and records were available to them. The Court also noted that a motion for disqualification must be filed before a member of the Court has given an opinion on the merits, to prevent litigants from speculating on the outcome. On Issue 2: Section 8, Rule 117 must be applied prospectively. The Supreme Court, under its constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure, also has the power to determine whether such rules shall have prospective or retroactive effect. The Court reasoned that the time-bar was established to balance the interests of both the State and the accused. Applying it retroactively to a dismissal that occurred on March 29, 1999, before the rule's effectivity on December 1, 2000, would be unjust and oppressive to the State. It would effectively shorten the two-year period granted by the rule and would sanction the State for failing to comply with a rule that was not yet in existence. Therefore, the two-year period for reviving the cases should be computed from December 1, 2000, giving the State until December 1, 2002, to act. The filing of the new informations on June 6, 2001, was well within this period. On Issue 3: No, the respondent failed to comply with the essential prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117. First, the rule requires the 'express consent' of the accused to the provisional dismissal. The Court found that the respondent, through his counsel, made judicial admissions during the proceedings in the Court of Appeals that he did not give his express consent. These admissions are binding upon him. His motion before the trial court only sought a judicial determination of probable cause and the withholding of arrest warrants, not the dismissal of the cases. Second, the rule requires notice to the offended party. The Court, after examining the records, found no proof that the heirs of the victims were ever notified before the cases were dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. The absence of these mandatory requirements prevents the application of the time-bar in the respondent's favor.
Main Doctrine
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which establishes a two-year time-bar for reviving provisionally dismissed criminal cases, must be applied prospectively, not retroactively. For cases that were provisionally dismissed before the rule's effectivity on December 1, 2000, the two-year period is to be counted from this effective date. The Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure includes the authority to determine their prospective or retroactive application to prevent injustice, particularly to the State, which cannot be expected to comply with a rule that did not exist at the time of the dismissal.