People v. Cornejo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Emilia M. Favor, the offended party, is the legitimate wife of appellant Francisco Cornejo. Appellant Esmeralda de Guzman was aware of this marital relationship. In January 1931, the offended party filed a complaint for concubinage against the appellants, but the case was dismissed on April 8, 1932, due to her non-appearance. A second complaint for the same offense was filed on March 8, 1933, leading to the conviction of the appellants. Procedural History: The appellants were found guilty of concubinage after trial. Francisco Cornejo was sentenced to two years of prision correccional, and Esmeralda de Guzman to three years of destierro. They appealed the decision. The Appeal: The appellants contend that the offended party had pardoned her husband, Francisco Cornejo, in April 1932, when she returned to live with him in their conjugal dwelling. They also argue that the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove their continued cohabitation as husband and wife after this pardon was insufficient.
Issue(s)
Whether the offended party's return to live with her husband, Francisco Cornejo, in April 1932, constituted a pardon that extinguished the criminal action for concubinage. Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved that the appellants continued to live as husband and wife after the alleged pardon.
Ruling
The appealed judgment is reversed, and the appellants are acquitted of the charges, with costs de oficio.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the offended party's return to live with her husband, Francisco Cornejo, in April 1932, was equivalent to a pardon. This was particularly significant given her prior non-appearance in the first concubinage case, which was explained by her consent to pardon her husband. Although under the former law a pardon did not extinguish the criminal action, the Court noted that the Revised Penal Code, which was in force at the time of the decision, provided that a pardon by the offended party extinguishes the criminal action. Since this provision was favorable to the accused, it was applied retroactively to the facts of the case, even though the alleged acts occurred before the Revised Penal Code became effective. The Court emphasized that this pardon effectively extinguished the criminal action. On Issue 2: The Court found the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellants continued to live as husband and wife after the alleged pardon to be insufficient. The prosecution attempted to establish this by presenting Jacinto Villaruz, who testified that he lived as a tenant in a house on a lot allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership, and that the appellants lived with him there as husband and wife for a month in 1932. However, the Court found this testimony unreliable and contradictory. It was established that the lot in question was sold by appellant Francisco Cornejo to Apolinaria Bautista in June 1931 and subsequently leased to Francisco Lucero. The Court questioned how Villaruz could be a tenant in 1932 after the lot had been sold and leased to another. Furthermore, Lucero testified that Villaruz never lived on the lot after Lucero occupied it. Given these inconsistencies and the lack of credible proof, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the continued cohabitation of the appellants as husband and wife after the pardon.
Main Doctrine
A pardon granted by the offended party extinguishes the criminal action for concubinage, and this provision of the Revised Penal Code, being favorable to the accused, is applicable retroactively to acts committed before its effectivity. Furthermore, the prosecution must present sufficient and credible evidence to prove the elements of the crime, including the continuation of the illicit relationship after any alleged pardon.