Ten Forty Realty v. Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. (petitioner), through President Veronica G. Lorenzana, allegedly acquired a 324 sqm residential house and lot at #71 18th Street, E.B.B., Olongapo City, from Barbara Galino via Deed of Absolute Sale on December 5, 1996, acknowledged by 'Katunayan', with BIR Certification for capital gains tax paid. Petitioner claims tax declaration under TCT No. 002-4595-R and 002-4596. Galino continued possessing the property until April 24, 1998, when she sold it to Marina Cruz (respondent), who immediately occupied it, made it habitable by reconnecting utilities, declared it for tax purposes on April 23, 1998 (new tax dec issued), and filed a miscellaneous sales application with CENRO as alienable public land. Petitioner learned of the second sale, tolerated occupation initially, filed barangay complaint on October 16, 1998 (no settlement), sent demand to vacate and pay rentals on April 12, 1999 (ignored), incurring P5,000 attorney's fees and P500 appearance fees. Respondent counters that petitioner, a corporation, cannot own public land; Galino merely borrowed from Lorenzana, not sold; no prior possession by petitioner; house uninhabitable pre-sale to her. Procedural History: Petitioner filed ejectment complaint (Civil Case No. 4269) on May 12, 1999, before MTCC-Olongapo, alleging unlawful detainer via tolerance. MTCC ruled October 30, 2000 for petitioner: vacate, pay P500/month from April 24, 1999, attorney's fees P5,000, costs. On appeal, RTC Branch 72 (May 4, 2001) reversed: no tolerance but waiver/deed to respondent; no delivery to petitioner (Art. 1428); corporation disqualified from public land. CA (Aug 31, 2001) affirmed RTC: no unlawful detainer (no contract/tolerance); should be forcible entry (prescribed); ownership provisional for possession. The Petition: Petitioner argues via Rule 45: (1) CA erred holding no tolerance; (2) erred classifying as forcible entry needing prior possession; (3) erred deeming respondent's possession as ownership exercise. Seeks reversal, asserting first buyer status, delivery via Galino's possession for it, tax declarations, and ownership provisional only.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent's occupation was by mere tolerance of petitioner, supporting unlawful detainer. Whether the case is unlawful detainer or prescribed forcible entry. Whether CA erred in considering respondent's possession as ownership exercise and resolving ownership provisionally.
Ruling
The Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Alleged Occupation by Tolerance): Petitioner failed to prove tolerance from possession's inception, essential for unlawful detainer under Rule 70, Sec. 1, Rules of Court; bare complaint allegations of 'immediate occupation merely tolerated' contradict initial unlawfulness and lack averments of prior permission (Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365: tolerance must start possession, else forcible entry). No express/implied contract shown; Galino's continued possession post-1996 sale was her own (tax declarations, resale), negating delivery under Arts. 1496-1498, Civil Code (prima facie presumption from public deed rebutted by no actual/symbolic possession: Pasagui v. Villablanca). Demand on April 12, 1999, irrelevant without initial tolerance; thus, possession illegal ab initio from April 24, 1998 entry. Reassessment of facts impermissible under Rule 45 (only errors of law), no exceptional reasons. Respondent's acts (tax declaration April 23, 1998, repairs, CENRO application) evidenced adverse ownership claim, putting petitioner on guard. Result: no unlawful detainer; forcible entry prescribed (1 year from entry). On Issue 2 (Nature of the Case): Complaint allegations mimicked unlawful detainer (post-sale tolerance, demand within 1 year), conferring MTCC jurisdiction initially, but evidence showed illegal entry/possession from start, converting to forcible entry (prior possession indispensable: Gener v. De Leon; Tirona v. Alejo). Rule 70, Sec. 1 distinguishes: forcible entry (FISTS deprivation, prior de facto possession); unlawful detainer (lawful start, terminates on demand/contract end: Go v. CA). Nature by complaint allegations/relief sought (Chico v. CA), but proof governs; here, disguised forcible entry beyond prescription (filed May 1999 1 year from April 24, 1998). No prior petitioner possession proven; Galino not its possessor. On Issue 3 (Alleged Acts of Ownership): Parties based possession on ownership claims, justifying provisional ownership resolution for de facto possession (Rule 70, Sec. 16; no error). Double sale: Art. 1544—petitioner unrecorded, no possession (material/symbolic); respondent first good faith possessor (relied on Galino's tax dec/possession, no red flags: Art. 526 good faith presumption). Property alienable public land (Olongapo certification; no 30-year possession proof for conversion: Republic v. CA); corporation disqualified (Const. Art. XII, Sec. 3). Respondent prevails provisionally; no res judicata on title (Javelosa v. CA).
Main Doctrine
In ejectment suits, the nature of the action—forcible entry or unlawful detainer—is determined by the complaint's allegations and proven facts, with forcible entry requiring prior de facto possession unlawfully deprived by force, stealth, etc., and unlawful detainer necessitating initial lawful possession via tolerance or contract that later terminates upon demand. Tolerance or permission must be present from the very start of the defendant's possession; otherwise, possession is illegal ab initio, converting the case to prescribed forcible entry if beyond one year from entry. Execution of a public deed of absolute sale constitutes only prima facie delivery under Article 1498, Civil Code, which is rebutted by the vendee's failure to take actual, constructive, or symbolic possession, as continued possession by vendor negates transfer. In double sales of immovable unregistered property, Article 1544 prioritizes: (1) good faith first registrant; (2) good faith first possessor (material or symbolic); (3) oldest good faith title, with buyers obligated to investigate possessors' rights. Private corporations are constitutionally barred from acquiring alienable public domain lands except by lease (max 25 years, 1000 hectares), requiring proof of 30-year open, continuous possession to convert to private property. Ejectment rulings on ownership are provisional for possession de facto only, without res judicata on title.