Guanga v. Dela Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Carmelita Guanga and Artemio dela Cruz are siblings, children of Nicolasa and Ireneo dela Cruz, disputing a two-storey house at No. 11 Ifugao Street (formerly No. 7 Jacinto Street), Barretto, Olongapo City (the 'Property'). Artemio claimed ownership via Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (1-4) 3407 filed on 2 October 1968 with the Bureau of Lands, asserting occupation since 1961; City Assessor certifications dated 7 January 1969 and 22 May 1989 confirmed tax declarations in his name; he executed Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage over the Property and lot on 30 May 1973 and 30 October 1974 in favor of Rosita Bonilla, with Carmelita signing as witness on the latter. Nicolasa held Tax Declarations 001-1601, 001-1602, 001-3622; executed a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights to Artemio on 3 May 1989, later impugned by her 1 August 1989 letter; Carmelita held Tax Declaration 001-4523 and acted as Nicolasa's attorney-in-fact in mortgaging to Jose Peñaflor in the early 1990s, leading to foreclosure. On 18 December 1996, Artemio allowed Carmelita temporary use of the second floor for her husband's wake; she refused to leave post-wake despite demands, culminating in a final written demand on 16 March 1998. Artemio filed criminal complaints for falsification (I.S. Nos. 97-603, 97-604) against Carmelita, dismissed by the Fiscal; prior RTC cases involved Peñaflor's writ of possession (Civil Case No. 38-0-93, 22 November 1993) and dismissal of Artemio's annulment petition (Civil Case No. 15-0-94, 4 March 1998) for lack of jurisdiction. Affidavits from Ampara B. Carey and Editha Crisostomo attested Carmelita's residence since 1952 and 1960, with her son Charlie staying during her temporary absence at a farm in Jolo, Barretto since 1994. Procedural History: Artemio filed unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 4065) in MTCC Olongapo Branch 5 on April 1998; Carmelita answered denying ownership, alleging continuous possession via family use, her son's stay, and prior RTC decisions, claiming no jurisdiction for lack of barangay conciliation and forum-shopping. MTCC ruled for Artemio on 26 April 1999, ordering vacatur and P10,000 attorney's fees, relying on mortgages as proof of prior possession and non-response to demand. Carmelita appealed to RTC Branch 72, which reversed on 28 July 2000, finding illogical tolerance amid pending falsification cases, prior possession via Peñaflor mortgage as attorney-in-fact, and continuous possession through son, deeming her entitled to half inheritance share. Artemio appealed to CA, which reversed RTC on 25 April 2001, reinstating MTCC, holding RTC's illogic speculative, mortgage irrelevant to possession per Art. 2127 Civil Code, and affirming MTCC's factual findings on tolerance and prior possession via evidence. CA denied MR on 1 October 2001. The Petition: Carmelita petitioned SC under Rule 45, assigning CA errors: (I) holding mere tolerance; (II) better possession to Artemio; (III) considering Waiver; (IV) deeming RTC decision speculative; (V) inconsistent probative value of mortgages vis-à-vis registration without possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent Artemio dela Cruz has better prior physical possession de facto over the Property, justifying ejectment of petitioner Carmelita Guanga. Whether the petition raises questions of law reviewable under Rule 45, or merely factual issues beyond SC jurisdiction.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 25 April 2001 and Resolution dated 1 October 2001 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Carmelita Guanga must vacate the Property in favor of respondents.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Better Right of Prior Physical Possession de Facto: Unlawful detainer resolves only better de facto possession, not ownership; ownership evidence admissible solely for prior possession (National Onion Growers v. Lo; Pajuyo v. CA). Artemio's 1968 sales application (occupancy since 1961), 1969/1989 tax declarations, 1973/1974 mortgages (witnessed by Carmelita) prove dominion/control, satisfying possession as 'subject to one's will' without literal occupancy (Pajuyo). Carmelita's post-Nicolasa tax declaration, affidavits, impugned Waiver letter, undated sales application fail against Artemio's independent proofs; nothing shows Nicolasa's prior tax filing or application pre-1968. Mortgage under Art. 2127 Civil Code needs no possession, but Artemio's execution evidences it; tolerance for wake (post-1996) was terminable at will upon demand (16 March 1998), no time bar from 1994 RTC case. RTC Branch 72's contrary findings speculative (e.g., illogic of tolerance amid falsification filed post-wake), ignoring evidentiary weight; CA properly deferred to MTCC facts absent patent error. Peñaflor cases irrelevant as Artemio stranger, dismissed not on merits. On the Reviewability of Questions under Rule 45: The petition purely assails factual findings on prior possession, beyond SC review under Rule 45, Sec. 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which confines certiorari to legal questions on applicable law given facts; factual doubts are resolved by trial courts whose findings, if supported, bind appellate tribunals (citing McDonald's Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.). Even relaxing this, no reversible error exists as MTCC/CA correctly applied ejectment rules. This procedural bar traps Bar examinees confusing factual re-examination with legal errors, emphasizing SC's non-tripartite fact-finding role.
Main Doctrine
In unlawful detainer or ejectment proceedings under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the sole and primary issue is who has the better right to physical or material possession de facto of the property, not juridical possession or ownership thereof. Courts may receive evidence on ownership or right of possession de jure only to resolve the issue of prior de facto possession, but such inquiry is provisional and does not extend to adjudicating title, which must be threshed out in a separate ordinary civil action. Prior possession is proven by acts like tax declarations in one's name, mortgage contracts executed by the claimant, sales patent applications claiming long occupancy, and certifications of tax assessments, which collectively establish dominion and control over the property. Tolerance by the owner or possessor prior in right renders the defendant's occupation precarious and terminable at will, without need for a fixed period or prescription, upon mere demand to vacate. Factual findings of the trial court on possession, supported by substantial evidence and undisturbed by the appellate court absent grave abuse, bind higher courts, especially in petitions under Rule 45 limited to pure questions of law.