Penera v. Commission on Elections
MODIFICATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Rosalinda A. Penera and Edgar T. Andanar were candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, during the May 14, 2007 elections. Andanar filed a petition to disqualify Penera and her party mates, alleging they engaged in premature campaigning and partisan political activity before the official campaign period began. Specifically, Andanar claimed that on March 29, 2007, a day before the campaign period commenced, Penera and her companions conducted a motorcade, announced their candidacies, and solicited votes. 2. Procedural History: The Petition for Disqualification was filed by Andanar with the COMELEC Regional Election Director. Penera filed an answer, admitting to a motorcade but asserting it was a customary dispersal of supporters and not campaigning, citing a previous case. The case was transmitted to the COMELEC main office and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. While the case was pending, Penera was elected and assumed office as Mayor. The COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution disqualifying Penera for premature campaigning. Penera moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc. This denial led to the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the COMELEC's resolutions disqualifying petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera from her mayoral post. Penera argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, asserting that the evidence presented by Andanar was insufficient and that her actions did not constitute premature campaigning. She contends that the motorcade was a spontaneous dispersal of supporters and not an act designed to promote her candidacy. Furthermore, she questions the COMELEC's reliance on photocopied and unauthenticated evidence. The petition also raises legal arguments concerning the interpretation of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, and its effect on the applicability of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue(s)
Whether Rosalinda A. Penera engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Whether the contents of the complaint were deemed admitted for failure of Penera to specifically deny the same. Whether Edgar T. Andanar presented competent and substantial evidence to justify a conclusion that Penera violated Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that Penera's motorcade constituted premature campaigning. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified Penera despite the alleged failure of Andanar to present competent, admissible, and substantial evidence.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, affirmed the Resolutions of the COMELEC Second Division and en banc, and declared that the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is the rightful successor to the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, due to Penera's disqualification. The TRO issued was ordered lifted.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether Rosalinda A. Penera engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period: The Court found that Penera, by her own admissions and those of her witnesses, participated in a motorcade after filing her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on 29 March 2007, which was a day before the campaign period began. This motorcade, consisting of vehicles adorned with balloons and a streamer, proceeded through several barangays, with supporters throwing candies to the crowd. The Court held that such conduct, including the use of campaign paraphernalia and distribution of items to the public, constitutes a form of election campaign or partisan political activity under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Court rejected Penera's defense that it was merely a dispersal of supporters, finding the presence of balloons and candies inconsistent with a spontaneous dispersal. Therefore, Penera engaged in premature campaigning. On Whether the contents of the complaint were deemed admitted for failure of Penera to specifically deny the same: The Court agreed with the COMELEC en banc that Penera could no longer advance arguments contrary to her admissions. Penera's Answer and Position Paper admitted to a motorcade occurring after filing her COC, although she disputed its nature. The COMELEC en banc found that Penera did not specifically deny material averments in Andanar's Petition and Position Paper, such as the motorcade going as far as Barangay Mabini and announcing their candidacy, thus these averments should be considered admitted. The Court emphasized that Penera's attempt to change her stance by claiming she made no such admissions was unavailing, as her earlier pleadings contained admissions that supported the COMELEC's findings. On Whether Edgar T. Andanar presented competent and substantial evidence to justify a conclusion that Penera violated Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient. This included Penera's own admissions regarding the motorcade, the affidavits of Andanar's witnesses, and photographic evidence. While acknowledging that ex parte affidavits and photocopied pictures might have limitations, the Court held that when taken together with Penera's admissions, they constituted substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The COMELEC, as a trier of facts, found the evidence adequate to establish the violation. On Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that Penera's motorcade constituted premature campaigning: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated that its role in a certiorari petition is to review errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, not to re-evaluate evidence. The COMELEC, with its fact-finding capabilities, is in a better position to assess evidence. The Court found that the COMELEC's conclusion that Penera's actions constituted premature campaigning was based on substantial evidence and a correct application of election laws. The COMELEC's rejection of Penera's defense and its interpretation of the Barroso case were deemed reasonable and not arbitrary or whimsical. On Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified Penera despite the alleged failure of Andanar to present competent, admissible, and substantial evidence: This issue is intrinsically linked to the sufficiency of evidence. As the Court found that substantial evidence was indeed presented and properly appreciated by the COMELEC, there was no grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC's Resolutions were supported by evidence and consistent with the law. The Court also addressed the dissenting opinion's argument regarding the effect of Republic Act No. 9369, holding that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains applicable and was not repealed by the new law. The Court harmonized the provisions, stating that while the definition of 'candidate' changed, the prohibition against premature campaigning, which can be committed by any person intending to run, remains valid and enforceable upon the filing of a COC.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification of Rosalinda A. Penera for premature campaigning. The Court held that despite amendments to the definition of 'candidate' under Republic Act No. 9369, which posits that a person is considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period, engaging in acts like motorcades with campaign paraphernalia and distribution of candies after filing a certificate of candidacy but before the official campaign period still constitutes premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are deemed designed to promote the candidate's election, and the COMELEC's factual findings, supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive on the Supreme Court absent grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, Penera was disqualified, and the Vice-Mayor was declared the rightful successor.