Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Erlinda Krishnan (Respondent) was a client of Luzon Development Bank (LDB) who sought to withdraw time deposits amounting to P28,597,472.70. LDB refused to honor the certificates, alleging they were fraudulent. Consequently, Krishnan filed a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages and applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the writ on February 27, 2001, leading to the garnishment of LDB's accounts in BPI Family Bank and the Central Bank. Procedural History: LDB filed several motions to lift the attachment, which were initially granted by the RTC but later nullified by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ordered LDB to file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57. Subsequently, the RTC directed Krishnan to file a new attachment bond of P35,000,000.00, which she did. LDB then filed an 'Omnibus Motion' and a 'Motion to Admit Bank Property in Lieu of Counterbond,' praying that they be allowed to deposit Certificates of Title of real property instead of a cash deposit or a surety bond. The RTC denied these motions, and the CA affirmed the denial, ruling that Rule 57 requires cash or a counter-bond. The Petition: The petitioners (LDB, et al.) filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court. They argued that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion by misconstruing Rule 57. Specifically, they contended that Section 2 of Rule 57 uses the general term 'deposit,' which should not be limited to cash and should allow for the deposit of real property to secure any contingent lien.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's denial of the petitioners' motion to deposit bank property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond to discharge a writ of preliminary attachment.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals (CA) did not err in affirming the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) denial of the motion to deposit bank property in lieu of a counter-bond. Under Section 2 and Section 5 of Rule 57, the law provides that an attachment may be stayed or lifted if the party makes a 'deposit' or gives a 'counter-bond.' The Court applied the 'plain meaning rule' of statutory construction, as articulated in Alcazar v. Arante, which dictates that words should be given their ordinary and commonly-accepted signification. In the context of Section 5, the word 'deposit' is unmistakably linked to the word 'amount,' which regularly refers to a sum of money. Therefore, the Court concluded that 'deposit' cannot be broadened to include real properties or certificates of title. Citing Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante, the Court reiterated that the only ways to secure the discharge of an attachment are through a counter-bond or a cash deposit. Consequently, the petitioners' attempt to substitute real property for the required cash or bond was legally unmeritorious.
Main Doctrine
The term 'deposit' as used in Sections 2 and 5 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court refers specifically to a cash deposit. This interpretation is derived from the plain meaning rule, where the word 'deposit' is proximately related to the word 'amount,' a term commonly associated with a sum of money. Consequently, a defendant seeking to prevent or lift an attachment does not have the option to deposit certificates of title or real property in lieu of the required cash or counter-bond.