Teo Tung v. Machlan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner, Teo Tung (alias Teo Tunga), a Chinese laborer with a certificate of residence, resided in the Philippines since the Spanish era. On April 24, 1914, he was convicted for violating the Opium Law and sentenced to deportation to Singapore. This sentence was executed on April 10, 1915, and his certificate of residence was cancelled. Procedural History: After his deportation, Teo Tung returned to the Philippines within a year and resumed his business and family life. He continued to pay his cedula and internal revenue licenses. In 1917, he was detained but released by verbal order of the Governor-General. He was arrested again on January 21, 1933, investigated by a board of inquiry, which recommended deportation. He was released on bond. The Petition: Teo Tung sought a writ of injunction to prevent interference with his liberty or, alternatively, a writ of habeas corpus if he was in confinement for deportation. He argued that the Revised Penal Code, which superseded the law under which he was convicted, did not provide for deportation as a penalty for recidivists violating the Opium Law, thus nullifying the prior deportation sentence.
Issue(s)
Whether the execution of a prior sentence of deportation, imposed under a law later amended by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) to omit deportation as a penalty for Opium Law violations, is retroactively nullified by Article 22 of the RPC. Whether the action of the Governor-General in ordering the release of an alien previously detained for deportation constitutes a definitive decision on his status as an undesirable alien, thereby terminating any responsibility stemming from a prior criminal conviction.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding that the respondents were acting arbitrarily and illegally in attempting to enforce the 1914 deportation sentence. If the petitioner was in custody, he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Yu Sionga v. Director of Prisons (G.R. No. 39849). While Yu Sionga held that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) eliminated the penalty of deportation for Opium Law violations when the sentence was not yet executed, this principle does not apply when the sentence of deportation has already been executed. The Court clarified that once a portion of a sentence, such as deportation, has been carried out, it is of no more force than any other executed penalty, like confinement, which has likewise been completed. The omission of deportation from the RPC as a penal sanction merely means that future deportation cases for such offenses are to be determined through ordinary administrative proceedings, rather than by sentence of a criminal court. This change in the Penal Code does not grant a right to return and live in the Islands to those who were lawfully deported under previously existing laws. On Issue 2: The Court held that the act of the Governor-General in 1917, who restored the petitioner to liberty after he had been arrested with a view to deportation, must be regarded as a definitive decision on the petitioner's status. The Governor-General possessed plenary powers in the deportation of undesirable aliens. His executive act, occurring seventeen years prior to the current arrest, constituted a finding that the petitioner was not an undesirable alien and effectively terminated any responsibility that the respondents might have sought to enforce based on his conviction in criminal case No. 938. Therefore, the subsequent attempt by customs authorities in 1933 to enforce the 1914 sentence was deemed arbitrary and illegal on the face of the record, especially given the petitioner's open and continuous residence since the Governor-General's intervention.
Main Doctrine
A deportation order, once executed, cannot be revived or enforced by virtue of a subsequent change in law that omits the penalty of deportation, as the executed penalty is considered complete. Furthermore, a prior executive act of liberty granted by the Governor-General, implying a determination that the alien was not undesirable, can terminate any prior responsibility for conviction, barring subsequent deportation based on that conviction.