Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corporation
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In 1959, Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) contracted with Pasay City to reclaim foreshore lands. The Republic of the Philippines challenged this agreement. In a final and executory 1998 Decision in Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared the contract null and void for being ultra vires. However, to prevent unjust enrichment, the Court awarded RREC and Pasay City P10,926,071.29 plus 6% per annum interest from 1962, based on quantum meruit for the partial work done. Procedural History: Despite the finality of the 1998 Decision, RREC and Pasay City filed multiple pleadings to re-litigate and adjust the award, which the Supreme Court repeatedly denied or expunged. In 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued a Writ of Execution. However, Sheriff Reyner S. De Jesus issued a Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay for a grossly inflated amount of P49,173,064,201.17, which was a substantial deviation from the Supreme Court's judgment. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which declared the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Notice null and void. During these proceedings, RREC terminated the legal services of its counsel, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, for loss of trust and confidence after he filed unauthorized complaints against the CA Justices. The Petition: Two consolidated petitions were filed before the Supreme Court. In G.R. No. 208205, Atty. Roxas filed a Petition for Review Pro Hac Vice in his personal capacity, challenging his termination as counsel and insisting on the P49 billion award. In G.R. No. 208212, RREC, through its new counsel, also filed a Petition for Review, assailing the CA's nullification of the writ of execution and likewise arguing for the inflated P49 billion award.
Issue(s)
First, whether the money claim against the Republic should have been first brought before the Commission on Audit. Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay as null and void. Third, whether Pasay City has a share in the monetary award granted by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals. Lastly, whether the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing Atty. Romeo G. Roxas as the rightful counsel of RREC.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review dated September 5, 2013 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 27, 2009 and Resolution dated July 16, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102750 are affirmed. Atty. Romeo G. Roxas' Petition for Review (Pro Hac Vice) is DENIED for his lack of legal standing. The Petition for Final Execution and Settlement is EXPUNGED. Republic Real Estate Corporation is STERNLY WARNED against filing redundant pleadings. Atty. Roxas is ORDERED to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate Sheriff IV Reyner S. De Jesus.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue: Yes, the case is premature. The Supreme Court held that all money claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by Presidential Decree No. 1445 and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000. The universal rule is that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution to satisfy judgments, as this would paralyze public services. The power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered; the prosecution, enforcement, or satisfaction of the judgment must be pursued in accordance with the rules laid down in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. RREC's attempt to enforce the judgment directly through the courts was a procedural shortcut that must be rejected. On the second issue: No, the Court of Appeals was correct in declaring the writ and notice null and void. The 1998 Supreme Court decision in Republic v. Court of Appeals is final and executory, and under the doctrine of res judicata, it is the settled law of the case. A final judgment is immutable and unalterable. The duty of a sheriff in executing a judgment is purely ministerial; the sheriff must strictly conform to the letter of the judgment's dispositive portion. Sheriff De Jesus's act of re-computing the P10.9 million award to over P49 billion was a material and substantial alteration of the final judgment, which he had no authority to do. Therefore, the notice he issued was palpably at variance with the judgment and is null and void. On the third issue: Yes, Pasay City has a share in the award. The dispositive portion of the 1998 Decision is clear and unequivocal: the amount shall be divided by Pasay City and RREC, 'share and share alike.' Applying the plain-meaning rule or verba legis, this phrase means that each party receives an equal share. RREC's argument that the division should be based on contribution is erroneous. If the Court had intended such an interpretation, it would have used different language, such as 'in proportion to their contribution.' Since the wording is unambiguous, there is no need for further interpretation. On the last issue: No, the Court of Appeals did not err. A client has the absolute right to discharge their attorney at any time, with or without cause. The attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary and cannot be made irrevocable. Atty. Roxas's claim that his contingency fee agreement was 'coupled with interest' is untenable because the agreement was a champertous contract—one where the lawyer agrees to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk in consideration of receiving a part of the proceeds. Such contracts are void for being against public policy. Since Atty. Roxas was validly terminated as counsel and is not a real party in interest, he has no legal standing to file a petition on RREC's behalf.
Main Doctrine
A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable, and a writ of execution must strictly conform to the dispositive portion of the decision. Any material or substantial variance renders the writ void. Furthermore, all money claims against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit (COA) before any judicial execution can be pursued, in line with the doctrine of state immunity and the requirement for proper appropriation of public funds. An attorney-client relationship can be terminated by the client at any time, and a lawyer's contingency fee agreement to shoulder all litigation costs in exchange for a share of the recovery is a void champertous contract.