Larena v. Teves
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Pedro Teves, born in Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, owned a house and lived with his family there from 1904 onwards. In 1919, he registered as an elector in the municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, and subsequently ran for representative of the second district of Oriental Negros, which included Bacong. He again ran for reelection in 1922 and for provincial board member in 1925, each time stating under oath in his certificates of candidacy that his residence was Bacong. He did not register as an elector in Dumaguete during this period. His registration in Bacong was only cancelled on April 5, 1934, upon his petition. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros declared the election of Pedro Teves to the office of municipal president of Dumaguete null and void. The Petition: Pedro Teves appealed the decision of the lower court.
Issue(s)
Whether Pedro Teves maintained his legal residence in Dumaguete despite registering as an elector and running for office in Bacong. Whether the affidavits in his certificates of candidacy conclusively established his residence in Bacong. Whether the cited cases of Yra vs. Abaño and Vivero vs. Murillo were applicable to the case.
Ruling
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the election of Pedro Teves to the office of municipal president of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, is declared lawful and valid, with the right to assume said office.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of legal residence: The Court held that the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which requires not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Despite Pedro Teves registering as an elector in Bacong in 1919 and subsequently running for various provincial and insular positions while stating under oath that he was a resident of Bacong, his actual dwelling and family home remained in Dumaguete. The Court emphasized that a sojourn in a place, however long, without the intention of making it a permanent home, will not qualify the sojourner as an elector unless otherwise provided by statute. Since Teves never abandoned his home in Dumaguete and never lived with his family in Bacong, he never lost his legal residence in Dumaguete. On the conclusiveness of affidavits in certificates of candidacy: The Court ruled that the affidavits made by Teves upon registering as an elector in Bacong and in his subsequent certificates of candidacy, stating his residence therein, were at most prima facie evidence of his residence in Bacong. These statements were not conclusive and could be attacked in a judicial proceeding. The Court reiterated that mere registration as an elector in a municipality does not automatically make one a resident thereof, especially when contradicted by actual facts. On the applicability of cited cases: The Court found the doctrines laid down in Vivero vs. Murillo and Yra vs. Abaño to be applicable. In Vivero, it was held that a student living with parents in a municipality, who pursues studies elsewhere but returns during vacations, does not lose residence. Similarly, in Yra, the Court clarified that being a "qualified voter" does not necessarily mean being a registered voter, and failure to register does not deprive a candidate of the right to be voted for. These cases supported the principle that actual domicile and intent are paramount over mere registration or statements in candidacy documents.
Main Doctrine
A person's legal residence is synonymous with domicile, which requires not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Mere registration as an elector or candidacy in a municipality, with affidavits stating residence therein, does not conclusively establish legal residence if the person's actual dwelling and family home remain in another municipality.