People v. David
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The case involves two informations filed against Leovigildo David. The first, for frustrated murder, alleged that on April 18, 1931, in Dinalupihan, Bataan, Leovigildo David willfully, illegally, and criminally shot Jose V. Reyes four times with a revolver, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation, inflicting a serious bullet wound at the back above the left clavicle. The second, for discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, alleged that on the same date and place, Leovigildo David willfully, illegally, and criminally shot German Pinili with his revolver, the bullet penetrating the latter's left side and lodging in the left scapula, resulting in approximately 25 days of medical treatment. The accused was a recidivist, having been previously convicted of less serious physical injuries. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Bataan found Leovigildo David guilty of frustrated murder in criminal case No. 3310 and sentenced him to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify Jose V. Reyes in the sum of one thousand pesos, and to pay costs. In criminal case No. 3296, he was found guilty of discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries and sentenced to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, and to pay costs. The Petition: The defendant-appellant assigned several errors, including the trial court's finding him guilty of frustrated murder and discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, and its adoption of the prosecution's theory that he fired from behind with the deliberate intent to kill Jose V. Reyes, instead of accepting the defense's theory of self-defense of a relative and that the offended party was facing him.
Issue(s)
Whether the crime committed against Jose V. Reyes constitutes frustrated murder. Whether treachery was present in the commission of the crime against Jose V. Reyes. Whether the accused had the intention to kill Jose V. Reyes. Whether the accused performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the death of Jose V. Reyes but did not by reason of causes independent of his will. Whether the crime committed against German Pinili constitutes discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the accused.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the Court of First Instance. It declared Leovigildo David guilty of frustrated homicide in criminal case No. 3310 and sentenced him to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to indemnify Jose V. Reyes for damages in the sum of P1,030.79. In criminal case No. 3296, he was declared guilty of discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries and sentenced to four months and one day to three years, nine months, and three days, with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the crime against Jose V. Reyes: The Court ruled that the crime committed was frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder. It found that treachery was not present because the accused fired the shot while facing the victim, and the victim's position changed due to being shoved by a constabulary soldier, allowing for potential evasion. The Court also determined that while the accused had the intention to kill Jose V. Reyes, the defense of a relative was not applicable as the aggression had already ceased. The Court concluded that all acts of execution for homicide were performed, but death was prevented by timely medical intervention, thus constituting frustrated homicide. On the presence of treachery: The Court held that treachery was not present. The evidence showed that Jose V. Reyes was facing Leovigildo David when the shot was fired. The fact that the victim was shoved by a constabulary soldier, causing him to stagger and turn his back, occurred simultaneously with the third shot and was not a means employed by the accused to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Therefore, the element of treachery, which requires that the offender employs means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make, was absent. On the intention to kill Jose V. Reyes: The Court found that the defendant's intention to kill Jose V. Reyes was obvious. Despite the invocation of defense of a relative, the Court noted that the aggression had already ceased when the defendant fired at Jose V. Reyes. The act of firing at the victim, under these circumstances, indicated an intention beyond merely repelling aggression against his father, thus demonstrating a clear intent to kill. On the performance of all acts of execution: The Court affirmed that the defendant performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the death of Jose V. Reyes. Expert testimony indicated that the wound, which perforated the lung, was mortal had it not been for timely and adequate medical intervention. Therefore, the crime was frustrated homicide, as death was prevented by causes independent of the defendant's will, specifically the intervention of medical science. On the crime against German Pinili: The Court held that Leovigildo David was liable for the consequences of his act against German Pinili, even though the shot was not aimed at him. Applying Article 1, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, the Court stated that any person voluntarily committing a felony or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, even if the wrongful act done is different from that intended. Thus, the defendant was liable for discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. On the applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: The Court ruled that the Indeterminate Sentence Law was applicable to the defendant-appellant in both cases. For frustrated homicide, the maximum penalty was set as the maximum of prision mayor, and the minimum was a penalty within prision correccional. For discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, the maximum was the maximum period of prision correccional, and the minimum was a penalty within arresto mayor.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court modified the trial court's decision, convicting the accused of frustrated homicide and discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and modifying the penalties imposed.