Sierra Grande Realty Corp. v. Ragasa
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Sierra Grande Realty Corporation is the registered owner of the property at No. 2280 Roberts Street, Pasay City, under TCT No. 19801, purchased in 1975 by its incorporator Sochi Villanueva to house his ailing mother. Sochi allowed his brothers Richard and Bernardino Villanueva to temporarily stay there; Richard left in 1979. In 1984, Elmer and Nancy Tan were permitted to occupy after eviction from an Ermita apartment. Upon Sochi's death in 1985, Bernardino, Elmer, and Nancy conspired to simulate contracts to sell and deeds of absolute sale over portions to Golden Apple Realty Corporation and Rosvibon Realty Corporation. In G.R. No. (Golden Apple Realty v. Sierra Grande, 640 Phil. 62, 2010), the Supreme Court invalidated these for fraud, which became final. On September 28, 2012, Sierra Grande demanded vacatur, but respondents refused, alleging no receipt of demand, prior redemption of mortgage from Manphil Investment Corporation annotated on the title, and thus a right to possess. Procedural History: On October 25, 2012, Sierra Grande filed unlawful detainer complaint (Civil Case No. M-PSY-12-15305-CV) in MeTC Pasay, raffled to Branch 47 then re-raffled to Branch 46 post-failed JDR. MeTC ruled for Sierra Grande on September 10, 2013, finding tolerance occupation, ordering vacatur, P20,000 attorney's fees, and costs. RTC Pasay Branch 108 (Judge Ragasa) affirmed in toto on April 30, 2014; reconsideration denied August 15, 2014. Sierra Grande moved for execution pending appeal September 10, 2014; denied October 29, 2014, citing 'good reasons' exception and pending CA petition. Reconsideration denied April 8, 2015, awaiting CA resolution. Meanwhile, only Elmer, Golden Apple, and Rosvibon appealed to CA; Bernardino and Nancy did not, making RTC decision final as to them. CA later decided September 30, 2015. The Petition: Sierra Grande filed certiorari petition under Rule 65 directly to SC on June 29, 2015, imputing grave abuse of discretion to Judge Ragasa for denying execution pending appeal despite mandatory rules in ejectment cases. It argued RTC decision immediately executory per Sec. 21 RRSP and Rule 70 Sec. 21, no good reasons needed. Respondents countered: Sierra Grande lacked capacity to sue post-SEC revocation; Frank Villanueva unauthorized sans board resolution; improper direct resort to SC, should go to CA; reliance on Eudela v. CA for discretionary execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the SC properly acquired jurisdiction over the certiorari petition despite incomplete service on all respondents. Whether Sierra Grande had capacity to sue and Frank Villanueva was authorized despite SEC revocation and lack of board resolution. Whether direct resort to SC violated hierarchy of courts. Whether Judge Ragasa committed grave abuse of discretion in denying execution pending appeal by requiring 'good reasons.'
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is meritorious. The Orders dated October 29, 2014 and April 8, 2015 are annulled and set aside. RTC must issue writ of execution pending appeal forthwith.
Ratio Decidendi
On Jurisdiction over Parties: Certiorari is original independent action requiring jurisdiction over parties; acquired over petitioner upon filing, over respondents via service of August 3, 2015 Resolution requiring comment, complied by Elmer/Golden Apple and Rosvibon. Bernardino did not comment; Nancy unserved (unknown whereabouts), but as RTC decision final against non-appealing parties and issue moot as to them, SC proceeds on merits per rules. Citing Reicon Realty (753 Phil. 251) and Province of Leyte (761 Phil. 466) on independent nature; Rule 46 Sec. 4 re Rule 56 Sec. 2. Supervening fact: only some appealed to CA, finality as to others. On Capacity to Sue and Authority: Sierra Grande's SEC revocation June 21, 2013 lifted prior order but re-revoked; under Corp. Code Sec. 122, continued 3 years (until 2016) for suits; petition filed June 29, 2015 within period. No board resolution needed for GM Frank Villanueva to verify/certify per Cagayan Valley Drug (568 Phil. 572) exceptions (Chair, Pres., GM). SPA by majority directors authorizes suit, akin to Nestle (817 Phil. 1030) but valid here vs. questionable single signer there; constitutes board act. Citing Esguerra v. Holcim (717 Phil. 77) general rule, exceptions apply. On Hierarchy of Courts: Original certiorari jurisdiction concurrent but hierarchy requires CA filing first as SC last resort; exceptions include time element/exigency. Ejectment summary, needs expediency; pure question of law on execution propriety; discretionary SC cognizance for compelling reasons. Citing Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales (862 SCRA 684), Diocese of Bacolod (751 Phil. 301); Intramuros (857 SCRA 549) on ejectment speed. On Grave Abuse in Denying Execution: Interlocutory orders unappealable but certiorari-available if GAD (Rule 65 Sec. 1). In unlawful detainer, RRSP Sec. 21 and Rule 70 Sec. 21 mandate immediate execution of RTC appellate decision, ministerial, no discretion/good reasons/bond; repeals prior inconsistencies. Judge erred applying Rule 39 Sec. 2 'good reasons' from Eudela (286 Phil. 683, injunction case); distinguished as non-summary. ALPA-PCM (684 Phil. 451) controls: no justification needed, rationale expeditiousness provides inherent good reason. GAD as contrary to law/jurisprudence (Imperial v. Armes citing ATO v. CA); ejectment summary restores order promptly, execution not merits-preclusive.
Main Doctrine
In unlawful detainer cases governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTC decision on appeal from the MeTC is immediately executory upon motion by the prevailing party, without prejudice to further appeal to the CA or SC. This execution is ministerial, requiring no exercise of discretion, no 'good reasons,' and no bond, as mandated by the use of 'shall' in Section 21 thereof and Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The rationale is to achieve expeditious and inexpensive resolution, restoring possession promptly to prevent social disorder. Denial of such motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, assailable via certiorari under Rule 65. The rule applies even if a petition for review is pending in the CA, distinguishing it from discretionary execution under Rule 39, Sec. 2 in ordinary actions.