People v. Tamayo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The appellant, Crisanto Tamayo, was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, for a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of the said municipality. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, conviction was again rendered, and a fine was imposed. Procedural History: The appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court and subsequently in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. The Petition: The appellant brought this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the repeal of a penal statute, without a saving clause, affects the criminal liability of an accused for acts committed prior to the repeal. Whether a person can be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts that are no longer criminal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of the proceedings against the appellant, with costs de oficio.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of repeal of a penal statute: The Court acknowledged the doctrine established in United States v. Cuna and Wing v. United States that the repeal of a criminal act, even without a saving clause, does not necessarily destroy criminal liability. However, the Court clarified that this doctrine does not extend to holding that a person can be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts that are no longer criminal. The Court noted that while the Philippine rule is more in conformity with Spanish doctrine, even in Spain, prosecution cannot be had if the offense ceases to be criminal. The repeal in this case was absolute, and the legislative intent was clear that the conduct formerly denounced was no longer deemed criminal. Therefore, it would be illogical for the Court to attempt to sentence the appellant for an offense that no longer exists. On the issue of prosecuting for acts no longer criminal: The Court held that even under common law and in America, a more favorable attitude exists towards the accused relative to repealed statutes than has been adopted in the Philippines. However, the Court emphasized that even with the established Philippine doctrine, the prosecution, conviction, and punishment for acts that have ceased to be criminal is not permissible. The absolute repeal of section 2 of municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, meant that the act complained of was no longer illegal in that municipality. Consequently, the Court found it imperative to dismiss the proceedings against the appellant, as sentencing him would be for an offense that no longer exists.
Main Doctrine
A prosecution for an act that has ceased to be criminal due to the repeal of the penal statute under which it was charged cannot be sustained, even in the absence of a saving clause, as it would be illogical to sentence an accused for an offense that no longer exists.