Kare v. Locsin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellant Exequiel Kare and defendant-appellee Julian M. Locsin were opposing candidates in a special election for Representative of the First District of Albay. Locsin was proclaimed the winner by the provincial board of canvassers. Kare filed an election protest before the House of Representatives. Procedural History: The House of Representatives, through its committee on elections, heard the protest and adopted a resolution on January 31, 1933, unseating Locsin and declaring Kare the elected representative. Prior to this resolution, Locsin had served as a member of the House from September 29, 1931, to January 30, 1933, and received compensation for his services. The Petition: Kare filed a complaint praying for a personal judgment against Locsin for the compensation amounting to P9,600 paid to Locsin for his services, plus P4,000 in damages, alleging that Locsin illegally usurped the office and that Kare was rightfully entitled to the compensation from the date of his supposed election.
Issue(s)
Whether the judicial courts have jurisdiction to order a member of the House of Representatives to reimburse the compensation received during their tenure when such member was recognized by the House as the de jure incumbent but was later unseated via an election protest.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of First Instance sustaining the demurrer to the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is affirmed. The plaintiff-appellant is not entitled to recover the compensation paid to the defendant-appellee.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that under Section 18 of the Organic Act, the House of Representatives is the 'sole judge' of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members. The Court reasoned that when the House accepts the credentials of a member, administers the oath, and allows them to participate in proceedings and draw a salary, this recognition is an adjudication that confers a de jure right to the office. Citing the U.S. case of Page v. United States, the Court emphasized that this recognition is final and can only be reviewed or annulled by the House itself. The fact that the House may later unseat the member does not retroactively transform their status into that of a 'usurper' or a 'de facto' officer. The Court distinguished this from cases involving municipal or provincial officers, noting that those bodies are not constitutionally designated as 'sole judges' of their members' qualifications. Because Locsin drew his pay by the authority of the House, his right to retain that compensation is res judicata for the courts. Consequently, the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking to recover such payments, as the House's determination of Locsin's right to compensation necessarily implies a lack of right in any other claimant for that same period.
Main Doctrine
The House of Representatives, as the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, renders an adjudication that is final and binding. A member who has been seated, allowed to serve, and paid compensation by the House is considered a de jure officer for the period of service, and their right to compensation cannot be retroactively divested or questioned by the courts, even if they are later unseated.