Gamboa v. Vito

G.R. No. 44750 · 1935-12-03 · J. IMPERIAL, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the possession and lease of Hacienda Macamig. Serafin Gamboa, the petitioner, had obtained a loan from Demetrio Gamboa, the guardian of the minor Eulalio Lopez, and secured this loan with a mortgage on the hacienda. Subsequently, the guardian leased the hacienda to Serafin Gamboa, although this lease agreement was not initially approved by the court overseeing the guardianship. 2. Procedural History: Serafin Gamboa, as the lessee, took possession of certain portions of Hacienda Macamig with the guardian's consent but without explicit court approval. The respondent judge, Jose Lopez Vito, issued an order on November 7, 1935, compelling Gamboa to return these portions and desist from taking possession of others, warning of imprisonment for non-compliance. Gamboa's motion for reconsideration was denied. 3. The Petition: Serafin Gamboa filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the respondent judge's order. He argued that the judge lacked jurisdiction to disapprove the lease contract, as its term did not exceed six years, and that the order of November 7, 1935, was unappealable, leaving him without an adequate remedy. The petition was dismissed, with the Supreme Court finding the order appealable and the judge to have acted within his jurisdiction.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent judge had jurisdiction to disapprove the lease contract and issue the order of November 7, 1935. Whether the order of November 7, 1935, is appealable.

Ruling

The petition is dismissed. The respondent judge had jurisdiction to pass upon the lease offers and to approve one of them. The order of November 7, 1935, is appealable, and therefore, neither a writ of certiorari nor a preliminary injunction lies.

Ratio Decidendi

On Whether the respondent judge had jurisdiction to disapprove the lease contract and issue the order of November 7, 1935: The Court held that the respondent judge did have jurisdiction to pass upon the petitioner's lease offer. The leasing of a realty belonging to the guardianship of a minor is an act of administration that falls under the direction, supervision, and jurisdiction of the court overseeing the guardianship, as provided by Sections 551 and 55[3] of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that the petitioner was already in possession of certain portions under a lease contract with the guardian did not divest the respondent judge of his jurisdiction to rule on the lease offers and approve one. The judge's reason for disapproving the petitioner's offer, citing Article 1548 of the Civil Code, was based on the express provision in the prior authorizing order that the lease contract was subject to judicial approval. On Whether the order of November 7, 1935, is appealable: The Court opined that the order of November 7, 1935, is indeed appealable. This is because the order finally determined the right that the petitioner claimed under the lease contract, specifically his right to retain possession of the portions already delivered to him and to take possession of other portions to be vacated by the existing lessee. Since the order was appealable and the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction, the remedies of certiorari and preliminary injunction were not proper. The warning of imprisonment for non-compliance did not alter the appealability of the order or the availability of remedies; if the order were appealed, the petitioner would not be imprisoned until its legality was finally determined.

Main Doctrine

The Court held that a judge of a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to pass upon and approve or disapprove lease offers concerning property belonging to a minor's guardianship. The leasing of realty belonging to a guardianship is an act of administration subject to the direction, supervision, and jurisdiction of the court overseeing the guardianship. Consequently, an order issued by the guardianship court that finally determines a party's rights under a lease contract is appealable, and a writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy if an appeal is available.

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