People v. Santos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Provincial Fiscal of Cavite filed an information against Augusto A. Santos for violation of section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2, penalized by section 29 thereof. The alleged violation occurred on April 29, 1935, within 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point, Corregidor Island. The accused, as the registered owner of two fishing motor boats, allegedly had his boats fish, loiter, and anchor without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce within three kilometers from the shore line of Corregidor Island, an area over which the naval and military authorities of the United States exercise jurisdiction. Procedural History: Upon arraignment, the counsel for the accused moved for the remand of the case to the justice of the peace court, citing a previous ruling that the penalty applicable fell under section 83 of Act No. 4003, which was within the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The Court of First Instance agreed that the case fell within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace court but noted that due to the alleged commission of the infraction within the waters of Corregidor Island, the competent court would be the justice of the peace court of Corregidor, not Cavite. Consequently, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case, cancelling the bond, without prejudice to the filing of a new information in the justice of the peace court of Corregidor. The Petition: The People of the Philippine Islands appealed the dismissal order, assigning as the sole error the court a quo's dismissal of the case on the ground that it did not fall within its original jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void. Whether the acts charged against the accused constitute a crime or a violation of a criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case. It held that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 is null and void and without effect. Consequently, the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos was charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, leading to the dismissal of the information filed against him.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2: The Court found that section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 prohibited boats from fishing, loitering, or anchoring within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations under the jurisdiction of the United States naval or military authorities, particularly Corregidor. However, the proviso stipulated that boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 could fish in these areas only upon written permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities. The Court meticulously examined Act No. 4003 and found no similar provision prohibiting such activities without permission. The enabling Act, specifically section 4 of Act No. 4003, only granted the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Agriculture and Commerce) the authority to issue rules and regulations consistent with the Act to carry into effect its provisions. Since Act No. 4003 itself did not contain a similar prohibition, the conditional clause in the administrative order effectively supplied a defect in the law and extended its provisions. This act of supplying a defect and extending the law is equivalent to legislating, a power exclusively reserved to the Philippine Legislature (under the Jones Law) and now to the National Assembly (under the Constitution). Therefore, the conditional clause constituted an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary and an exercise of legislative power that could not be delegated. Consequently, the conditional clause was declared null and void and without effect. On whether the acts charged constitute a crime: Since the Court declared the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 null and void, the prohibition contained therein, which the accused was charged with violating, ceased to have legal effect. The information alleged a violation of this specific conditional clause. Without a valid prohibition, the acts of fishing, loitering, or anchoring within the specified area, even without permission, did not constitute a crime or a violation of any criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Therefore, the dismissal of the case by the Court of First Instance was upheld.
Main Doctrine
An administrative order that extends the provisions of a law or legislates on matters not covered by the enabling act is null and void for being an excess of regulatory power and an exercise of legislative power that cannot be delegated.