Locsin v. Paredes
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a complaint filed by C. N. Hodges against Salvacion Locsin et al. for the recovery of P16,417.25, plus interest. This sum represented the proceeds of a joint and several promissory note signed by the petitioners. The petitioners admitted the existence of the debt in their defense. 2. Procedural History: Following the admission of the debt, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a decision on June 6, 1935, ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the principal amount with interest and costs. This decision became final and executory. While a writ of execution was pending, C. N. Hodges filed motions to amend the dispositive part of the judgment to explicitly include the word "severally" in the order of payment. The respondent judge initially denied these motions but later amended the decision on November 26, 1935, to include the word "severally." 3. The Petition: Salvacion Locsin et al. filed an original petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to declare the order amending the dispositive part of the judgment void and illegal. They argue that the amendment was improperly made after the judgment had become final and executory and that the relief under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to the party in whose favor the judgment was rendered. The petitioners contend that the omission of "severally" was due to negligence and that the amendment was an attempt to alter the substance of the final judgment rather than clarify an ambiguity.
Issue(s)
Whether a party in whose favor a final and executory judgment has been rendered may seek its amendment under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the omission of the word "severally" in the dispositive part of a final and executory judgment, which clearly appears from the records to be a joint and several obligation, can be supplied by amendment after the judgment has become final and executory and is in the process of execution.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is denied. The order amending the dispositive part of the judgment is declared valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue: The relief afforded by Section 113 of Act No. 190 is for the party against whom an order or judgment has been rendered as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and not for the party in whose favor it has been rendered. Furthermore, the attorney for the respondent C.N. Hodges was notified of the decision on June 7, 1935, and failed to read it carefully, leading to the omission. This failure was due to his own negligence, preventing him from invoking the remedy under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure after the decision became final and executory. The Court cited Echarri and Azores vs. Belen Velasco (59 Phil., 570) to support the principle that the relief under Section 113 cannot be invoked if an adequate remedy at law was lost through negligence. On the second issue: The complaint, the promissory note, the prayer, and the conclusions of fact and law in the decision clearly indicated that the obligation was joint and several. The omission of the word "severally" in the dispositive part of the judgment was an oversight or a slip of the pen, rendering the judgment ambiguous. Such an ambiguity, which arises from an apparent omission that contradicts the clear tenor of the case, can be clarified at any time, even after the judgment has become final and executory and is in the process of execution. The respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in clarifying the dispositive part of the judgment by supplying the omitted word, as it merely corrected an ambiguity consistent with the established facts and the parties' understanding of the obligation. The Court relied on the principle that a judgment should conform to the allegations, evidence, and conclusions of fact and law, and that ambiguities can be clarified.
Main Doctrine
A party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered cannot resort to the remedy afforded by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint, the prayer thereof, the evidence and the conclusions of fact and of law arrived at by the trial judge in his decision that the obligation is joint and several in character, the omission of the word "severally" in the dispositive part of the judgment, through oversight, may be clarified at any time after the decision is rendered and even after it had become final, as it merely clarifies an ambiguity.