People v. De Jesus
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila for the theft of an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P2.65. He was sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party, and an additional penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional due to being a habitual delinquent. Procedural History: The accused appealed the sentence, disagreeing with the penalties imposed. His counsel de oficio recommended affirmance of the sentence. The Petition: The appellant questioned the penalties imposed, particularly the additional penalty for habitual delinquency.
Issue(s)
Whether the penalty imposed by the lower court is in accordance with law. Whether recidivism can be considered both as an aggravating circumstance for the principal penalty and as a basis for the additional penalty for habitual delinquency. Whether the additional penalty for habitual delinquency was correctly imposed.
Ruling
The appealed sentence is modified. The principal penalty is set at two months and one day of arresto mayor. The sentence, as modified, is affirmed in all other respects.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the principal penalty and the consideration of recidivism: The Court affirmed that the principal penalty for theft, given the value of the stolen items, is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The minimum period, one month and one day, was imposed. The Court noted that the voluntary confession of the appellant was a mitigating circumstance, and the absence of aggravating circumstances compensated for it. However, the Solicitor-General argued that recidivism, inherent in habitual delinquency, should be considered as an aggravating circumstance for the principal penalty. The Court acknowledged that recidivism is generally an aggravating circumstance, but in the context of habitual delinquency, it becomes a qualifying or inherent circumstance. Applying the principle of non bis in idem, recidivism cannot be considered both as an aggravating circumstance for the principal penalty and as a basis for the additional penalty for habitual delinquency. The Court reiterated that aggravating circumstances like treachery or evident premeditation, when they qualify a crime (e.g., homicide to murder), cease to be aggravating and become qualifying, and cannot be counted twice. On the issue of habitual delinquency and the additional penalty: The Court clarified that habitual delinquency is not a crime itself but a circumstance that warrants an additional penalty. The law provides for an additional penalty for habitual delinquents, which is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The appellant, by admitting to being a habitual delinquent and having committed theft for the third time within the prescribed period, was correctly subjected to this additional penalty. The Court found that the minimum of this additional penalty, as imposed by the lower court (two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional), was justified. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the additional penalty is to deter relapses. While recidivism is the basis for habitual delinquency, it should not be counted twice. Since recidivism was considered inherent in habitual delinquency, it could not be simultaneously an aggravating circumstance for the principal penalty. Therefore, in the absence of other aggravating circumstances, the minimum of the additional penalty was appropriate. On the imposition of the additional penalty: The Court affirmed the imposition of the additional penalty for habitual delinquency. The appellant's admission of guilt and the allegation in the information that he was a habitual delinquent, having been convicted of theft and qualified theft previously, supported this. The Court cited previous rulings that a plea of guilty admits all material facts alleged in the information, including prior convictions. The penalty prescribed for habitual delinquency is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The lower court imposed the minimum of this range, which the Supreme Court found to be justified, considering that recidivism was already accounted for as the basis for habitual delinquency and could not be counted again as an aggravating circumstance for the principal penalty.
Main Doctrine
Recidivism, when it constitutes habitual delinquency, cannot be simultaneously considered as an aggravating circumstance for the principal penalty and as a basis for the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, due to the principle of non bis in idem. However, recidivism can be considered in the imposition of the principal penalty, and habitual delinquency warrants an additional penalty.