Rodriguez v. Rovira
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez sought the approval of a subdivision plan for lot No. 1128, cancellation of the original certificate of title, and issuance of two new titles, one for himself (lot No. 1128-A) and another for Daniel Tirona (lot No. 1128-B). Daniel Tirona opposed this motion. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cavite denied Rodriguez's motion on January 17, 1936, citing lack of jurisdiction to amend a decision in a registration case where the lot was adjudicated to the conjugal partnership of Daniel Tirona and Felisa Osorio in 1915, and the one-year period for review had elapsed. Subsequently, Daniel Tirona and Rodolfo Tirona filed an application for a writ of possession. The respondent judge initially denied this application but later, in an order dated February 13, 1936, declared he had jurisdiction to pass upon an amended application for a writ of possession and set a hearing. Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez excepted to this order and filed a notice of appeal, submitting a bill of exceptions on February 26, 1936. The respondents opposed the approval of the bill of exceptions, and the respondent judge disapproved it on February 23, 1936, finding it filed out of time. The Petition: This petition for a writ of mandamus seeks to compel the respondent judge to approve the bill of exceptions and a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the judge from deciding the amended application for a writ of possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge erred in disapproving the bill of exceptions filed by the petitioner. Whether the respondent judge has jurisdiction to pass upon the amended application for a writ of possession.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The respondent judge is ordered to approve, certify, and forward the bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court. The preliminary injunction applied for is denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the disapproval of the bill of exceptions: The Court held that the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, filed on January 31, 1936, which argued that the court had jurisdiction to hear his motion for subdivision, was equivalent to a motion for a new trial. This motion was based on the ground that the order denying the subdivision motion was contrary to law, a valid ground for a new trial under Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court reiterated its consistent holding that a motion for reconsideration, regardless of its styling, if based on grounds for a new trial, has the same effect and suspends the period for perfecting an appeal. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the thirty-day period for perfecting the appeal by filing a bill of exceptions, making the subsequent bill of exceptions timely filed. On the jurisdiction to pass upon the amended application for a writ of possession: The Court denied the application for a preliminary injunction restraining the respondent judge from passing upon the amended application for a writ of possession. The Court noted that an injunction is an ancillary remedy and the relief sought in this regard had no bearing on the primary remedy of mandamus, which was addressed to the judge's action on the bill of exceptions. The Court did not explicitly rule on the judge's jurisdiction over the writ of possession in this decision, focusing instead on the procedural issue of the bill of exceptions.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration based on any of the causes enumerated in Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure as grounds for a motion for a new trial has the same effect as a motion for a new trial, regardless of the fact that it is styled differently, and suspends the period for perfecting an appeal by means of filing a bill of exceptions.